Daniel A. Lowenthal, Partner

Some courts permit debtors to designate vendors crucial to their business as “critical vendors.”  These are vendors that supply debtors with necessary goods or services.  With court permission, debtors are allowed to pay critical vendors amounts owing when a bankruptcy case is filed.  Accordingly, critical vendors often recover more on their pre-petition claims than other unsecured creditors.  In other words, critical vendors could receive a full recovery, while other creditors only receive a fraction of what they are owed.

A recent case before bankruptcy judge Karen B. Owens of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Dura Auto. Sys., LLC, No. 19-12378 (KBO), 2021 WL 2456944 (Bankr. D. Del. June 16, 2021), provides a cautionary reminder that the Third Circuit does not recognize the doctrine of implied assumption (i.e., assumptions implied through a course of conduct as opposed to those that are assumed pursuant to a motion and court order).

A creditor in bankruptcy must normally file a proof of claim by a certain specified time, known as the bar date, or have its claim be barred.  Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) provides a narrow exception to this rule when a creditor files a motion and “the notice was insufficient under the circumstances to give the creditor a reasonable time to file a proof of claim because the debtor failed to timely file the list of creditors’ names and addresses required by Rule 1007(a).”  Courts have disagreed about the meaning of this rule when a debtor timely files a list of creditors’ names and addresses (known as a creditor matrix), but improperly omits the creditor in question.  Can the creditor then take advantage of this provision, or does it only apply when the creditor matrix is not timely filed at all?  On May 25, 2021, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in line with the former approach, holding that a known creditor omitted from a creditor matrix can take advantage of Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) because when the creditor matrix omits a known creditor, it is not “the list of creditors’ names and addresses” that Rule 1007(a) requires.

A recent case shows how even late payments can be used to satisfy the ordinary course of business defense in a preference avoidance action. Baumgart v. Savani Props Ltd. (In re Murphy), Case No. 20-11873, Adv. Pro. No. 20-1070, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1035 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2021).

It is well-settled that if you are a debtor in chapter 11, you do not have the unfettered right to convert the case to a chapter 7 liquidation.  A recent 10^th Circuit decision shows why. Kearney v. Unsecured Creditors Committee et al., BAP No. 20-33, 2021 WL 941435 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2021).

It’s rare for a debtor in bankruptcy to raise allegations of involuntary servitude and a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  But one debtor did just that in a recent chapter 11 case.  The court had appointed a trustee to take over the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  This prompted the debtor to assert a violation of his constitutional rights, arguing that he would be involuntarily forced to work for his creditors.

We have blogged previously about section 546(e), the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain transfers otherwise subject to avoidance as preferences or fraudulent transfers.  See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).  Among the transfers protected by the section 546(e) safe harbor are transfers by or to a “financial participant” made “in connection with a securities contract.”  Id.  The Bankruptcy Code in turn defines “financial participant” to mean an entity that has certain financial agreements or transactions of “total gross dollar value of not less than $1,000,000,000 in notional or actual principal amount outstanding” or “gross mark-to-market positions of not less than $100,000,000 . . . in one or more such agreements or transactions.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(22A)(A).  In both cases, the “agreements or transactions” must be “with the debtor or any other entity.”  Id.  Since an entity cannot engage in an agreement or transaction with itself, does the language providing that such agreements and transactions must be “with the debtor or any other entity” mean that the debtor cannot be a financial participant”?  On December 23, 2020, Judge Shannon of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that debtors could be financial participants, disagreeing with a previous decision from the Southern District of New York.

In sophisticated real estate financing transactions, most prudent lenders attempt to deter borrowers from filing for bankruptcy before loans are paid in full by providing in loan documents that such a filing constitutes an event of default. Many lenders will insist that their borrowers remain “bankruptcy remote” in the form of a so-called “single asset real estate” entity during the term of the loan.

There are several ways in which property owners can advantageously use the Bankruptcy Code to effectuate strategic dispositions of assets.  But the bankruptcy process can be fraught with uncertainty that can upend the best laid plans. The matter of In re Wansdown Properties Corp. N.V., No. 19-13223 (SMB), 2020 WL 5887542 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) provides an instructive and cautionary example.

This post concerns computation of time under Bankruptcy Rule 9006.  The specific issue addressed is whether a bankruptcy court — when computing a filing deadline — should count a day when its clerk’s office is closed, even if the electronic filing system is available.  In a recent case, a federal district judge explained why in his view the day shouldn’t be counted.  Labbadia v. Martin (In re Martin), No. 3:20-cv-939, 2020 WL 5300932, (SRU) (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2020).

In an appeal of a bankruptcy court’s decision, a district court judge recently addressed the treatment of the “straddle year” for federal income tax under the Bankruptcy Code, which “does not appear to have been decided by any appellate court.”  In re Affirmative Ins. Holdings Inc. United States v. Beskrone, No. 15-12136-CSS, 2020 WL 4287375, at *1 (D. Del. July 27, 2020).

This post provides a quick primer on administrative expense claims.  These claims are entitled to priority for actual and necessary goods and services supplied to a debtor in bankruptcy.  For a claim to qualify for administrative expense status, a debtor must request that the claimant provide goods and services post-petition or induce the claimant to do so.  The goods or services must result in a benefit to the bankruptcy estate.  And the claimant bears the burden of proof that a claim qualifies for priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).

This post originally appeared in International Corporate Rescue, published by Chase Cambria Company (Publishing) Ltd.

COVID-19 is taking an alarming and unfortunate toll on the world’s population. In the United States, the number of COVID-19-related deaths will soon approach 75,000. Billions of dollars of economic output will be lost. As a consequence, on 27 March 2020, US lawmakers signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the ‘CARES Act’) into law. It provides USD 2.2 trillion in economic stimulus to various sectors of the American economy. This article explains three aspects of the CARES Act: a consumer economic stimulus, a small business payment protection program, and the impact of the CARES Act on US bankruptcy laws and procedures in several of the nation’s busiest bankruptcy courts.
 

A recent decision, In re: Grandparents.com, Inc.., et al., Debtors. Joshua Rizack, as Liquidating Tr., Plaintiff, v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Defendant, Additional Party Names: Grand Card LLC, provides insight on the intersection between and among contract, tort, and fraudulent transfer theories of recovery.

COVID-19 is taking an alarming and unfortunate toll on our country’s population. Each day, we collectively face daunting health risks, and the economic cost to individuals and businesses alike has already been, and will continue to be, staggering. Accordingly, more than at any point in the past decade, both debtors and creditors should consider the potential benefits of the bankruptcy process. This post discusses four basic bankruptcy concepts that always merit consideration, especially in these trying times.

When there are large numbers of substantial individual tort claims against a debtor, potentially involving claimants unknowable to the debtor who themselves may not know they have a claim, the bankruptcy process faces special problems.  One objective of bankruptcy is to afford final relief to the debtor from the debtor’s debts, but discharging the claims of those unknown claimants without notice and a hearing poses due process problems.  A standard way to address this issue, which has arisen prominently in asbestos cases, is for the debtor to create and fund a trust to provide for tort claims brought in the future, with the court issuing an injunction channeling such claims to the trust rather than the reorganized entity.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (providing for such trusts for asbestos-related litigation).  But are such trusts the only way to resolve such claims?  This question is raised by the Third Circuit’s recent decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020).  The debtor instead devised a process reliant on Rule 3003(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which authorizes a court to extend the time for filing a claim “for cause shown.”  In the circumstances of that case, and with publication notice to potential claimants, the Third Circuit held that this approach comported with due process.

When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of almost all proceedings to recover property from the debtor.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  A party in interest can seek an order exempting it from the automatic stay for cause.  11 U.S.C. § 362(d).  A creditor that fails to obtain relief from the stay is limited to the claim-adjudication process in bankruptcy court.  What happens if the bankruptcy court rules against a creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay, and the creditor seeks to appeal?  Can the creditor appeal immediately or must it wait until its claim is fully adjudicated in bankruptcy court?  The question turns on the interpretation of the federal statute governing bankruptcy appeals, which provides that appeals may be taken from “final judgments, orders and decrees . . . entered in cases and proceedings.”  28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (emphasis added).  An automatic stay does not finally resolve a bankruptcy “case,” but does it finally resolve a bankruptcy “proceeding”?  On January 14, the Supreme Court resolved that question affirmatively in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, ruling that a creditor who is denied relief from the automatic stay may appeal immediately.

Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to initiate an involuntary bankruptcy case against a debtor. The petition initiating the case must be filed by creditors holding claims aggregating to at least $10,000, and those claims must not be “contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.” 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). Courts have disagreed as to how this provision applies when a portion of a claim is undisputed. Some courts have held that, when the undisputed portion of a claim is sufficient for the aggregated claims to reach $10,000, a dispute about the remainder of the claim does not disqualify the claim as a whole. Other courts have held that any bona fide dispute about the amount of a claim is a “bona fide dispute as to liability or amount” that prevents a claim from being used to support an involuntary bankruptcy petition. On November 26, in Montana Department of Revenue v. Blixseth, 942 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit embraced the second position, ruling against a state tax agency that had a large tax claim against the debtor, most of which was subject to bona fide dispute but $200,000 of which was not.

The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee powers to avoid certain pre-bankruptcy transfers of the debtor’s property to other entities. For example, a trustee can avoid transfers made with the intent to impair the ability of creditors to collect on their debts. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). The Code gives the trustee the power to recover the transferred property from the initial recipient, and also from subsequent recipients, “to the extent the transfer is avoided.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). Courts have split on whether this language requires a trustee to get a judgment avoiding a transfer prior to recovering from a subsequent transferee, or whether a trustee can simply show that the transfer is avoidable as part of the action against the subsequent transferee. A related question, however, concerns what happens when a trustee has gotten a judgment avoiding a transfer, and then seeks to recover from subsequent transferees. Can those transferees challenge whether the original transfer was avoidable? This question is the central issue in a recent decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. Yip v. Google LLC (In re Student Aid Ctr., Inc.), Adv. Proc. No. 18-1493, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3310 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2019).

Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code enables trustees to avoid certain pre-bankruptcy transfers of “an interest of the debtor in property,” where the transfer was intended to defraud creditors or where the transfer was made while the debtor was insolvent and was not for reasonably equivalent value.   11 U.S.C. § 548(a).  Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code enables trustees to avoid a transfer of “property of the debtor” where a creditor of the debtor would have such a right under state law.  11 U.S.C. § 544(a).  The statutory requirement that the transfer be “of an interest of the debtor” or “property of the debtor” (emphasis added) has important implications for claims brought under sections 544 and 548 in the aftermath of a merger or acquisition.  This point is illustrated by a recent decision from the District Court of Delaware, affirming the dismissal of fraudulent transfer claims brought under sections 544 and 548 for failure to allege transfer of property by a debtor.  Miller v. Matco Electric Corp. (In re NewStarcom Holdings), Civ. No. 17-309 (D. Del. Sept. 6, 2019).

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, added in 2005, provides a route for debtors to obtain US recognition of their insolvency proceedings in other countries.  A foreign proceeding can be recognized under chapter 15 as either a “foreign main proceeding” or a “foreign nonmain proceeding.”  11 U.S.C. § 1517.  Recognition as a foreign main proceeding entitles a debtor to certain rights, such as the automatic stay of actions against the debtor that would normally be imposed in a bankruptcy case filed in the United States.  11 U.S.C. § 1520.  To obtain recognition of a foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding, the foreign proceeding must be pending in the country where the debtor has the “center of its main interests” (usually abbreviated “COMI”).  The precise meaning of this somewhat elusive phrase is still being worked out by judicial decision.  On August 12, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued another entry in the body of case law concerning this provision, ruling that an investment fund organized under Cayman Islands law, and involved in a liquidation proceeding there, had its COMI in the Cayman Islands rather than New York.

Here’s an update on recent political, social, and economic developments in Venezuela.  From our perspective as a blog focused on insolvency and restructuring topics, the upshot of what’s been taking place in Venezuela is that the chances of a debt restructuring in the coming months remain slim. 

Delaware Bankruptcy Judged Brendan Shannon granted mechanic’s lien claimants $1.6 million for making a substantial contribution in a case by “demonstrably and materially facilitating the process of reorganization.”  In re M & G USA Corp., No. 17-12307, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1398 (Bankr. D. Del. May 6, 2019).