Another domino has fallen. Earlier this year, we wrote about the challenges facing the crypto industry that resulted in the bankruptcy filings of Three Arrows Capital, Celsius Network, and Voyager Digital. We noted that other crypto entities could also end up in chapter 11, and that prediction has proven correct.
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Bankruptcy Update Blog provides current news and analysis of key bankruptcy cases and developments in US and cross-border matters. Patterson Belknap’s Business Reorganization and Creditors’ Rights attorneys represent creditors’ committees, trade creditors, indenture trustees, and bankruptcy trustees and examiners in US and international insolvency cases. Our team includes highly skilled and experienced attorneys who represent clients in some of the most complex cases in courts throughout the US and elsewhere.
The ramifications of uneven increases to fees in chapter 11 bankruptcies continue to ripple through federal courts.
A U.S. bankruptcy court recently denied chapter 15 recognition to a case in the Isle of Man (IOM). The court ruled that the foreign case was neither a foreign main proceeding nor a foreign non-main proceeding. Although the court found that the IOM proceeding was a “foreign proceeding,” it also held that the debtor’s center of main interests wasn’t in the IOM and the debtor didn't have an establishment there. In re Shimmin, No. 22-10039, 2022 LEXIS 2932 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Oct. 14, 2022).
To encourage parties to transact with debtors in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code in corporate bankruptcies provides highest priority to “administrative expenses,” which include “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); id. § 507(a)(2). Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the assumption or rejection of any executory contract—a contract in which the parties have ongoing duties of performance to each other when a bankruptcy case is filed—and provides that if the debtor rejects the contract, such rejection is treated as a breach occurring “immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 365. Because section 365 treats liability from such a breach as arising pre-petition, it is not treated as an administrative expense and is usually a general unsecured claim. The combination of these provisions therefore raises a question: what happens if there is an ongoing executory contract which, during the bankruptcy case, potentially provides benefits to the estate, but then is rejected by the debtor? Does liability for breach in this circumstance have administrative priority? This question was addressed in Finance of America LLC v. Mortgage Winddown LLC (In re Ditech Holding Corp.), 21-cv-10038 (LAK), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172793 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2022).
On September 15, President Biden announced a tentative deal with unions representing tens of thousands of railroad workers that helped narrowly avoid a strike that threatened to devastate the country’s delicate supply chains that have been strained since the beginning of the pandemic. Now the country awaits the outcome of the union member votes (which we may not know until mid-November), but even if the members approve the deal, the retail sector will still face empty shelves, job vacancies and surging inflation.
A bankruptcy court ruled that a creditor didn’t need to seek derivative standing to sue a liquidating trustee. The creditor, himself a trustee of the debtor’s employee stock-option plan, had standing to sue without prior court permission because his suit wasn’t brought on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. In re Foods, Inc., Case No. 14-02689, Adv. Pro. No. 21-3022, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 2331 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Aug. 23, 2022).
The owners of an ambitious Hawaiian golf project in the Makaha Valley of Oahu said Aloha (hello) to new owners, and Aloha (goodbye) to old debt obligations.
In an adversary proceeding, the collective owners of the Makaha Valley Country Club, golf courses, surrounding undeveloped land, and other related assets (the “Owners”) avoided obligations undertaken in connection with a loan extension provided by Tianjin Dinghui Hongjun Equity Investment Partnership (the “Lenders”). The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii ruled that the extension was constructively fraudulent, and thus avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 548.
It’s been a hard year for cryptocurrency. The values of most cryptocurrencies, including major coins such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, have continued to tumble. In fact, the price of one stablecoin, which is a form of cryptocurrency tied to another currency, commodity or financial instrument, de-pegged from its cryptocurrency token and entered into a downward spiral. Ultimately, the stablecoin and the crypto token it was pegged to collapsed, erasing $18 billion of value with it. In addition, one major cryptocurrency exchange platform recently warned investors that, in the event of bankruptcy, its users’ assets may be treated as property of the estate, which would leave users in the unfortunate position of being treated as unsecured creditors. This revelation caused that entity’s stock to plummet.
We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws. On June 5, the Supreme Court decided the case, ruling that the scheme violated the uniformity requirement, but remanding to the Fourth Circuit to consider the appropriate remedy.
Delaware Court Finds Texas’s Trust Fund Doctrine Lives, but Debtor's Fiduciary Claims Dead on Arrival
A Delaware bankruptcy court recently held that Texas’s “trust fund doctrine” remains applicable for companies that have not availed themselves of Texas’s formal dissolution process. Nonetheless, fiduciary claims by a chapter 7 debtor were dismissed because the debtor failed to assert such claims derivatively
The doctrine of equitable mootness is in the news again. The Supreme Court recently denied a cert. petition in a case where the petitioner wanted the doctrine ruled unconstitutional. KK-PB Financial LLC v. 160 Royal Palm LLC, Case No. 21-1197, 2021 WL 7247541 (petition), 2022 WL 1914118, (denying certiorari).
In the world of cryptocurrency, exchange platforms act as intermediaries allowing investors to buy and sell assets while making money through commissions and transaction fees. Any assets purchased may be held in either non-custodial or custodial wallets. If a customer chooses a custodial wallet, the platform holds and manages the assets through a private key, which is a string of characters that serves as a password. If a key is lost or forgotten, it may be impossible to recover, resulting in the permanent loss of the asset. In contrast, assets held in non-custodial wallets remain under the customer’s control with a private key.
A discharge in bankruptcy usually discharges a debtor from the debtor’s liabilities. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, sets forth certain exceptions to this policy, including for “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). (We have previously written about this provision in the context of statements respecting a debtor’s financial condition.) There is a split among the courts of appeal as to whether this provision applies only to a debtor who has some level of knowledge of the fraud, or whether the bar on discharge applies also when the debtor is liable only by imputation for a fraud committed by an agent or partner of the debtor. On May 2, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a case presenting this question.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan recently reminded us why Delaware choice-of-law provisions are so popular in limited partnership and other agreements.
The Fifth Circuit recently dismissed an appeal of a confirmation order as equitably moot. The decision was based on three key factors: the appellant hadn’t obtained a stay pending appeal, the plan had been substantially consummated, and practical relief couldn’t be fashioned if the plan was unwound. Talarico v. Ultra Petro. Corp. (In re Ultra Petro. Corp.), Case No. 21-20049, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 8941 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 2022).
As a result of Purdue Pharma’s proposed plan of reorganization, and the ongoing opioid epidemic that continues to grip the nation, the debate over non-consensual third-party releases has gone mainstream despite being a popular tool for debtors for decades.
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” While Congress has general authority to establish a bankruptcy system, bankruptcy laws must be “uniform.” But not every aspect of the bankruptcy system is the same across every judicial district. For instance, while most judicial districts have United States Trustees, which are funded by a special fee charged to debtors, the judicial districts of Alabama and North Carolina instead have Bankruptcy Administrators, which are funded by general appropriations to the judiciary. These different funding systems have sometimes resulted in differences in fees imposed on debtors between different judicial districts, raising the question of whether different fee obligations for debtors in different judicial districts is consistent with the uniformity requirement. In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court has agreed to consider this question.
“[E]nsnared between his involvement in a business that is legal under the laws of Arizona but illegal under federal law,” one debtor’s chapter 13 petition was recently dismissed due to his undisputed violations of the Controlled Substances Act.
Fireworks in the Sky but not in Court: Bankruptcy Judge Takes a Practical Approach to the Ordinary Course of Business Defense
A recent decision applied the ordinary course of business defense to a preferential transfer claim where the parties had engaged in only two transactions. In re Reagor Dykes Motors, LP, Case No. 18-50214, Adv. No. 20-05031, 2022 LEXIS 70 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2022). The court took a practical approach to the defense, given the absence of a detailed history of invoicing and payments between the parties.
Another case shows the perils of waiting until the final minutes to meet a court deadline. In re U-Haul, 21-bk-20140, 2021 Bankr LEXIS 3373 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. Dec. 10, 2021).
Considering the Conduct of Two PPP “Fraudsters,” Bankruptcy Court Shows Its Teeth but Declines to Bite (For Now)
“Messrs. Woods and Wu are fraudsters,” Judge Christopher S. Sontchi declared in the opening salvo of his scathing opinion. According to the former Chief Judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Woods and Wu fraudulently obtained a Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan on behalf of Urban Commons Queensway, LLC, which indirectly operates the Queen Mary, a cruise ship turned hotel docked near Long Beach, CA. Woods and Wu then “absconded with the proceeds, leaving either the Debtor or the United States to pay back the lender.”
A federal judge recently allowed a trustee’s preferential transfer claim against a law firm to proceed but dismissed a constructive fraudulent transfer claim. The decision highlights the pleading standards and analytical framework for motions to dismiss such claims. Insys Liquidation Trust v. Urquhart (In re Insys Therapeutics Inc.), Case No. 19-11292, Adv. No. 21-50359, 21 Bankr. LEXIS 2965 (JTD) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 28, 2021).
In many chapter 11 cases, creditors’ committees play a vital role in maximizing the recoveries of unsecured creditors. But the powers of creditors’ committees are circumscribed by both the Bankruptcy Code and case law.
One way committees try to enhance recoveries is by seeking “derivative standing” to commence adversary proceedings challenging the validity of a secured lender’s pre-petition liens. A recent decision shows how one court analyzed if a committee had standing to bring such actions. In re Platinum Corral, LLC, No. 21-00833-5-JNC, 2021 WL 4695327 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2021).
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Craig A. Gargotta rejected a debtor’s attempt to use “CARES Act” funds, which it did not actually qualify for, to pay creditors in its chapter 11 case. BR Healthcare Solutions (the “Debtor”) operated a nursing home under the name Karnes City Health & Rehabilitation Center near San Antonio. But in January of 2020, the Debtor’s principal “decided to close the nursing home  due a sustained period of net operating losses. By February 4, 2020, all of the remaining patients were transitioned out of the nursing home to other providers.” In March of 2020, the Debtor filed for chapter 11.
In a recent decision, a district court reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court and clarified the independent obligation of the Bankruptcy Court to ensure that a Chapter 13 Plan satisfies the necessary requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, irrespective of the parties’ conduct. In re: BRUCE D. PERRY, Debtor. KRISTA PREUSS, Standing Chapter 13 Tr., SDNY, Appellant, v. BRUCE D. PERRY, Appellee., No. 20-CV-4617 (CS), 2021 WL 4298192 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2021)
A key goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to prevent corporate insiders from profiting from their employer’s misfortune. Section 503(c) of the Code makes clear: “there shall neither be allowed, nor paid... a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's business” absent certain court-approved circumstances.
Some courts permit debtors to designate vendors crucial to their business as “critical vendors.” These are vendors that supply debtors with necessary goods or services. With court permission, debtors are allowed to pay critical vendors amounts owing when a bankruptcy case is filed. Accordingly, critical vendors often recover more on their pre-petition claims than other unsecured creditors. In other words, critical vendors could receive a full recovery, while other creditors only receive a fraction of what they are owed.
The Bankruptcy Code grants the power to avoid certain transactions to a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547–48. Is there a general requirement that these avoidance powers only be used when doing so would benefit creditors? In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico addressed this question, concluding, in the face of a split of authority, that there was such a requirement. In re U.S. Glove, Inc., No. 21-10172-T11, 2021 WL 2405399 (Bankr. D.N.M. June 11, 2021).
A recent case before bankruptcy judge Karen B. Owens of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Dura Auto. Sys., LLC, No. 19-12378 (KBO), 2021 WL 2456944 (Bankr. D. Del. June 16, 2021), provides a cautionary reminder that the Third Circuit does not recognize the doctrine of implied assumption (i.e., assumptions implied through a course of conduct as opposed to those that are assumed pursuant to a motion and court order).
Which Procedural Rules Apply to Non-Core, “Related-To” Matters in Federal District Court? Another Circuit Court Addresses the Issue
At stake in a recent decision by the First Circuit was this: when a bankruptcy matter is before a federal district court based on non-core, “related to” jurisdiction, should the court apply the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? The First Circuit ruled that the former apply, and in so doing joined three other circuits that have also considered this issue. Roy v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. (In re Lac-Megantic Train Derailment Litig.), No. 17-1108, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 16428 (1st Cir. June 2, 2021).[i]
A creditor in bankruptcy must normally file a proof of claim by a certain specified time, known as the bar date, or have its claim be barred. Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) provides a narrow exception to this rule when a creditor files a motion and “the notice was insufficient under the circumstances to give the creditor a reasonable time to file a proof of claim because the debtor failed to timely file the list of creditors’ names and addresses required by Rule 1007(a).” Courts have disagreed about the meaning of this rule when a debtor timely files a list of creditors’ names and addresses (known as a creditor matrix), but improperly omits the creditor in question. Can the creditor then take advantage of this provision, or does it only apply when the creditor matrix is not timely filed at all? On May 25, 2021, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in line with the former approach, holding that a known creditor omitted from a creditor matrix can take advantage of Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) because when the creditor matrix omits a known creditor, it is not “the list of creditors’ names and addresses” that Rule 1007(a) requires.
United States Bankruptcy Judge Harlin Hale recently dismissed the National Rifle Association’s Chapter 11 petition as not filed in good faith. The decision leaves the 150-year-old gun-rights organization susceptible to the New York Attorney General’s suit seeking to dissolve it.
A recent case shows how even late payments can be used to satisfy the ordinary course of business defense in a preference avoidance action. Baumgart v. Savani Props Ltd. (In re Murphy), Case No. 20-11873, Adv. Pro. No. 20-1070, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1035 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2021).
Appeals Court Rules That a Discharge Injunction Bars a Fraudulent Transfer Claim Based on a Non-Dischargeable Debt
A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts. Does a discharge injunction bar a fraudulent transfer action, when that action is brought based on an underlying non-dischargeable debt? In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered this issue, and concluded that the discharge injunction barred a fraudulent transfer action under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“AUFTA”), because the fraudulent transfer claim gave rise to a separate liability from the underlying non-dischargeable debt. SuVicMon Development, Inc. v. Morrison, 991 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. March 25, 2021).
It is well-settled that if you are a debtor in chapter 11, you do not have the unfettered right to convert the case to a chapter 7 liquidation. A recent 10th Circuit decision shows why. Kearney v. Unsecured Creditors Committee et al., BAP No. 20-33, 2021 WL 941435 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2021).
When serving pleadings in an adversary proceeding, you may want to skip the certified option and go with regular first-class mail, or do both.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004 governs service of process in adversary proceedings. The statute specifically provides for service by first class mail. And while some courts will also permit service of pleadings by certified mail, other courts forbid the use of certified mail.
Debtor Alleges Thirteenth Amendment Violation; Court Says Debtor Has Standing to Assert the Claim; Decision on the Merits to Follow
It’s rare for a debtor in bankruptcy to raise allegations of involuntary servitude and a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. But one debtor did just that in a recent chapter 11 case. The court had appointed a trustee to take over the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. This prompted the debtor to assert a violation of his constitutional rights, arguing that he would be involuntarily forced to work for his creditors.
It is well known in the restructuring world that a debtor in bankruptcy can’t get a PPP loan. But what if you’re a debtor and decide a PPP loan could save your business? Will a court dismiss the case so you can seek a loan?
A seat at the table: this is what you likely want when your financial interests are drawn into a bankruptcy court proceeding. You’ll seek to be heard and do what you can to maximize your recovery. This is especially true if you’re a creditor in a chapter 11 case. Yet a recent decision shows what can happen if you do the opposite and choose to “sit one out” rather than have a say in the outcome of a chapter 11 case. In re Fred Bressler, No. 20-31023, 21 WL 126184 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2021).
Perfect your liens on time or you may lose them. That’s the painful lesson U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Karen B. Owens taught Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. in her recent decision.
We have blogged previously about section 546(e), the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain transfers otherwise subject to avoidance as preferences or fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Among the transfers protected by the section 546(e) safe harbor are transfers by or to a “financial participant” made “in connection with a securities contract.” Id. The Bankruptcy Code in turn defines “financial participant” to mean an entity that has certain financial agreements or transactions of “total gross dollar value of not less than $1,000,000,000 in notional or actual principal amount outstanding” or “gross mark-to-market positions of not less than $100,000,000 . . . in one or more such agreements or transactions.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(22A)(A). In both cases, the “agreements or transactions” must be “with the debtor or any other entity.” Id. Since an entity cannot engage in an agreement or transaction with itself, does the language providing that such agreements and transactions must be “with the debtor or any other entity” mean that the debtor cannot be a financial participant”? On December 23, 2020, Judge Shannon of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that debtors could be financial participants, disagreeing with a previous decision from the Southern District of New York.
Proofs of Claim: Don’t Rely on the Mailbox Presumption – Be Sure Claims are Filed by the Bar Date with the Court Clerk or the Claims Agent
The Importance of Loan Underwriting When Restrictions on Bankruptcy Cannot Singlehandedly Save the Day: Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Phillip Pivelsky, et al.
In sophisticated real estate financing transactions, most prudent lenders attempt to deter borrowers from filing for bankruptcy before loans are paid in full by providing in loan documents that such a filing constitutes an event of default. Many lenders will insist that their borrowers remain “bankruptcy remote” in the form of a so-called “single asset real estate” entity during the term of the loan.
The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” The Bankruptcy Code in turn defines a “financial institution” to include not only financial institutions as conventionally understood, such as “a Federal reserve bank, or an entity that is a commercial or savings bank, industrial savings bank, savings and loan association, trust company, federally-insured credit union, or receiver, liquidating agent, or conservator for such entity,” but also a customer of such institutions when such institutions are “acting as agent or custodian for [such] customer . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A). Because a transfer to a “financial institution” in connection with a securities contract is shielded by section 546(e) from avoidance, the question of which “customers” of financial institutions qualify as financial institutions under this definition has become highly litigated. On October 22, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued a new decision on this question, ruling that the recipients of an alleged fraudulent transfer did not qualify as “financial institutions” under the Bankruptcy Code because the bank that transmitted the payments was not acting as an “agent or custodian” for the recipients.
The Best Laid Plans: How a Proposed Sale of NYC Real Estate Under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code Went Awry
There are several ways in which property owners can advantageously use the Bankruptcy Code to effectuate strategic dispositions of assets. But the bankruptcy process can be fraught with uncertainty that can upend the best laid plans. The matter of In re Wansdown Properties Corp. N.V., No. 19-13223 (SMB), 2020 WL 5887542 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) provides an instructive and cautionary example.
Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed. Rule 3003(c)(3) permits such time for filing to be extended “for cause shown,” and has been held, based on Rule 9006(b), to permit late filing upon a showing of “excusable neglect” by a claimant.) In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware rejected an effort by two late claimants to make use of this process, reasoning that the claimants had failed to meet Rule 3003(c)(3)’s “excusable neglect” standard because they had participated in the bankruptcy case for years without seeking to file claims.
This post concerns computation of time under Bankruptcy Rule 9006. The specific issue addressed is whether a bankruptcy court — when computing a filing deadline — should count a day when its clerk’s office is closed, even if the electronic filing system is available. In a recent case, a federal district judge explained why in his view the day shouldn’t be counted. Labbadia v. Martin (In re Martin), No. 3:20-cv-939, 2020 WL 5300932, (SRU) (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2020).
In an appeal of a bankruptcy court’s decision, a district court judge recently addressed the treatment of the “straddle year” for federal income tax under the Bankruptcy Code, which “does not appear to have been decided by any appellate court.” In re Affirmative Ins. Holdings Inc. United States v. Beskrone, No. 15-12136-CSS, 2020 WL 4287375, at *1 (D. Del. July 27, 2020).
Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a transfer is avoided under one of several other sections of the Code, a trustee may recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property” from “the initial transferee of such transfer,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” or “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). (Transferees in the last category are known as subsequent transferees.) For example, if an entity receives a fraudulent transfer of cash, and then passes on the cash to a third party, the third party can be liable under section 550. But what if the transfer is of a non-cash asset? To qualify as an “immediate or mediate transferee” under section 550, is it necessary to receive the actual asset, or does it suffice to receive funds derived from the asset? The Tenth Circuit addressed this question in its recent decision in Rajala v. Spencer Fane LLP (Generation Resources Holding Company, LLC), 2020 WL 3887850 (10th Cir. July 10, 2020). The Tenth Circuit held that, to qualify as a “transferee” under section 550, a party must have received the actual “property transferred."
This post provides a quick primer on administrative expense claims. These claims are entitled to priority for actual and necessary goods and services supplied to a debtor in bankruptcy. For a claim to qualify for administrative expense status, a debtor must request that the claimant provide goods and services post-petition or induce the claimant to do so. The goods or services must result in a benefit to the bankruptcy estate. And the claimant bears the burden of proof that a claim qualifies for priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
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