Jonah Wacholder, Associate

We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.  As we explained, the parties in that case disputed whether, if the fee difference were to be held unconstitutional, the appropriate remedy would be a refund for the debtors charged the higher fee or additional fees imposed on the debtors charged the lower fee.  The Supreme Court did not resolve that question, leaving the question to be resolved on remand.

We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws.  On June 5, the Supreme Court decided the case, ruling that the scheme violated the uniformity requirement, but remanding to the Fourth Circuit to consider the appropriate remedy.

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “establish . . .  uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”  While Congress has general authority to establish a bankruptcy system, bankruptcy laws must be “uniform.”  But not every aspect of the bankruptcy system is the same across every judicial district.  For instance, while most judicial districts have United States Trustees, which are funded by a special fee charged to debtors, the judicial districts of Alabama and North Carolina instead have Bankruptcy Administrators, which are funded by general appropriations to the judiciary.  These different funding systems have sometimes resulted in differences in fees imposed on debtors between different judicial districts, raising the question of whether different fee obligations for debtors in different judicial districts is consistent with the uniformity requirement.  In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court has agreed to consider this question.

A creditor in bankruptcy must normally file a proof of claim by a certain specified time, known as the bar date, or have its claim be barred.  Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) provides a narrow exception to this rule when a creditor files a motion and “the notice was insufficient under the circumstances to give the creditor a reasonable time to file a proof of claim because the debtor failed to timely file the list of creditors’ names and addresses required by Rule 1007(a).”  Courts have disagreed about the meaning of this rule when a debtor timely files a list of creditors’ names and addresses (known as a creditor matrix), but improperly omits the creditor in question.  Can the creditor then take advantage of this provision, or does it only apply when the creditor matrix is not timely filed at all?  On May 25, 2021, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in line with the former approach, holding that a known creditor omitted from a creditor matrix can take advantage of Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(6)(A) because when the creditor matrix omits a known creditor, it is not “the list of creditors’ names and addresses” that Rule 1007(a) requires.

A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).  Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).  A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.  Does a discharge injunction bar a fraudulent transfer action, when that action is brought based on an underlying non-dischargeable debt?  In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered this issue, and concluded that the discharge injunction barred a fraudulent transfer action under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“AUFTA”), because the fraudulent transfer claim gave rise to a separate liability from the underlying non-dischargeable debt.  SuVicMon Development, Inc. v. Morrison, 991 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. March 25, 2021).

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.  These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers.  Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.”  The Bankruptcy Code in turn defines a “financial institution” to include not only financial institutions as conventionally understood, such as “a Federal reserve bank, or an entity that is a commercial or savings bank, industrial savings bank, savings and loan association, trust company, federally-insured credit union, or receiver, liquidating agent, or conservator for such entity,” but also a customer of such institutions when such institutions are “acting as agent or custodian for [such] customer . . . in connection with a securities contract.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A).  Because a transfer to a “financial institution” in connection with a securities contract is shielded by section 546(e) from avoidance, the question of which “customers” of financial institutions qualify as financial institutions under this definition has become highly litigated.  On October 22, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued a new decision on this question, ruling that the recipients of an alleged fraudulent transfer did not qualify as “financial institutions” under the Bankruptcy Code because the bank that transmitted the payments was not acting as an “agent or custodian” for the recipients.

Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a transfer is avoided under one of several other sections of the Code, a trustee may recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property” from “the initial transferee of such transfer,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” or “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.”  11 U.S.C. § 550(a).  (Transferees in the last category are known as subsequent transferees.)  For example, if an entity receives a fraudulent transfer of cash, and then passes on the cash to a third party, the third party can be liable under section 550.[1]  But what if the transfer is of a non-cash asset?  To qualify as an “immediate or mediate transferee” under section 550, is it necessary to receive the actual asset, or does it suffice to receive funds derived from the asset?  The Tenth Circuit addressed this question in its recent decision in Rajala v. Spencer Fane LLP (Generation Resources Holding Company, LLC), 2020 WL 3887850 (10th Cir. July 10, 2020).  The Tenth Circuit held that, to qualify as a “transferee” under section 550, a party must have received the actual “property transferred."

Courts reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision to approve a chapter 11 reorganization plan over the objections of an interested party must consider not only the merits, but also (if implementation of the plan was not stayed) potential injury to the reliance interests of other parties relying on the plan. These issues are confronted in Drivetrain, LLC v. Kozel (In re Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas), 2020 WL 2121449 (10th Cir. May 5, 2020), a recent Tenth Circuit decision holding, based on circuit precedent, that an objector’s challenge to a chapter 11 plan that had already been implemented was barred under the doctrine of equitable mootness. Nonetheless, the decision noted that the doctrine is controversial and open to question.

When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of almost all proceedings to recover property from the debtor.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  A party in interest can seek an order exempting it from the automatic stay for cause.  11 U.S.C. § 362(d).  A creditor that fails to obtain relief from the stay is limited to the claim-adjudication process in bankruptcy court.  What happens if the bankruptcy court rules against a creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay, and the creditor seeks to appeal?  Can the creditor appeal immediately or must it wait until its claim is fully adjudicated in bankruptcy court?  The question turns on the interpretation of the federal statute governing bankruptcy appeals, which provides that appeals may be taken from “final judgments, orders and decrees . . . entered in cases and proceedings.”  28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (emphasis added).  An automatic stay does not finally resolve a bankruptcy “case,” but does it finally resolve a bankruptcy “proceeding”?  On January 14, the Supreme Court resolved that question affirmatively in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, ruling that a creditor who is denied relief from the automatic stay may appeal immediately.

The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee powers to avoid certain pre-bankruptcy transfers of the debtor’s property to other entities. For example, a trustee can avoid transfers made with the intent to impair the ability of creditors to collect on their debts. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). The Code gives the trustee the power to recover the transferred property from the initial recipient, and also from subsequent recipients, “to the extent the transfer is avoided.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). Courts have split on whether this language requires a trustee to get a judgment avoiding a transfer prior to recovering from a subsequent transferee, or whether a trustee can simply show that the transfer is avoidable as part of the action against the subsequent transferee. A related question, however, concerns what happens when a trustee has gotten a judgment avoiding a transfer, and then seeks to recover from subsequent transferees. Can those transferees challenge whether the original transfer was avoidable? This question is the central issue in a recent decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. Yip v. Google LLC (In re Student Aid Ctr., Inc.), Adv. Proc. No. 18-1493, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3310 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2019).

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, added in 2005, provides a route for debtors to obtain US recognition of their insolvency proceedings in other countries.  A foreign proceeding can be recognized under chapter 15 as either a “foreign main proceeding” or a “foreign nonmain proceeding.”  11 U.S.C. § 1517.  Recognition as a foreign main proceeding entitles a debtor to certain rights, such as the automatic stay of actions against the debtor that would normally be imposed in a bankruptcy case filed in the United States.  11 U.S.C. § 1520.  To obtain recognition of a foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding, the foreign proceeding must be pending in the country where the debtor has the “center of its main interests” (usually abbreviated “COMI”).  The precise meaning of this somewhat elusive phrase is still being worked out by judicial decision.  On August 12, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued another entry in the body of case law concerning this provision, ruling that an investment fund organized under Cayman Islands law, and involved in a liquidation proceeding there, had its COMI in the Cayman Islands rather than New York.

Two weeks ago, we discussed asset sales under Bankruptcy Code section 363.  As that post noted, section 363 requires court approval for asset sales outside the ordinary course of business, with courts ensuring that sales reflect a reasonable business judgment and have an articulated business justification.  Debtors may choose to sell assets via a public auction or through a private sale.  In our last post, we considered a case where a debtor initially arranged for a public auction and then decided to sell the property via a private sale.  What about the reverse case—what if a debtor agrees to sell property to a particular entity via a private sale, but then changes course and decides to hold a public auction instead?  On Wednesday, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered such a case in In re VCR I, LLC, No. 18-60368 (May 1, 2019).  The Fifth Circuit held that the prior agreement did not bar the change of course.

When a party files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay of litigation against a debtor for claims arising prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Where there is a basis for bankruptcy jurisdiction in federal court, federal law also permits parties to a state court action to remove the state court action to the federal district court for the district in which the state court action is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). (Usually, the action will then be automatically referred to a bankruptcy court in that federal judicial district.) Absent court action to modify the automatic stay, does the automatic stay block parties from carrying out such removal of state court actions against a bankruptcy debtor? In In re Cashco Inc., No. 18-11968-j7 (Bankr. D.N.M. December 12, 2018), a bankruptcy court considered an objection to removal on this ground by a chapter 7 trustee (“the Trustee”). While noting that courts have split on this issue, the bankruptcy court ruled that the automatic stay does not apply to removing a case to the bankruptcy court where the bankruptcy case is pending, nor to other proceedings in that court, including continuation of the removed action.

When a bankruptcy petition is filed, an automatic stay comes into effect staying proceedings against the debtor or the debtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The stay centralizes litigation regarding the debtor and its property in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. When contract entered into pre-bankruptcy contains an arbitration clause, a bankruptcy court will consider if the stay should be enforced or if the parties can resolve the matter in arbitration. In In re Argon Credit, LLC, No. 16-39654 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2018), a bankruptcy court considered this question in a dispute between  two non-debtor parties concerning the validity of loans issued by the debtor and part of the debtor’s estate. The bankruptcy court ruled that the arbitration clause was binding and ordered the stay lifted to permit arbitration to go forward.

Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes restrictions on the employment of professionals to assist a trustee, requiring that such professionals “not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate” and be “disinterested persons.” Section 363(b) permits the trustee, after notice and a hearing, to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate,” and does not impose restrictions on employment comparable to those of section 327(a). On Monday, in In re Nine West Holdings, Inc., Case No. 18-10947 (SCC), Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered the relationship between those provisions in deciding on an application to retain a management consultancy firm that had already been assisting the debtors prior to the bankruptcy petition. Judge Chapman held that the application was properly considered under section 363(b) rather than section 327(a). Applying the business judgment standard under 363(b) rather than the more stringent standard under 327(a), Judge Chapman approved the application.

Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any transfer that would be avoidable by creditors under state fraudulent transfer law. Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the bankruptcy trustee to recover from the transferee the transferred property in a fraudulent transfer avoided under section 550. Where funds were transferred in an intentional fraudulent transfer, but subsequently an equal or greater quantity of funds were transferred back to the debtor from the transferee, can the trustee still recover from the transferee? The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently considered this question in In re Incare LLC, Adv. No. 14-0248, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1339 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2018), and held that the answer was no, the trustee cannot recover.

Section 1141(d)(6)(A) and section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code together provide that debts owed by a corporation to a government entity are not dischargeable if such debts were obtained by false representations. Does this rule apply to claims by government entities seeking to enforce consumer fraud laws, where the government entities were not themselves the victims of the fraud? On February 14, 2018, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that it does not, ruling that such claims against corporations brought by states on behalf of their citizens are dischargeable in bankruptcy. In re TK Holdings Inc., Case No. 17-11375, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 414 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 14, 2018).

Bankruptcy courts lack the power to impose serious punitive sanctions, a federal district judge ruled recently in PHH Mortgage Corporation v. Sensenich, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207801 (D. Vt.  Dec. 18, 2018). Judge Geoffrey Crawford reversed a bankruptcy judge’s ruling that had imposed sanctions against a creditor based on Rule 3002.1(i) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the bankruptcy court’s inherent authority, and Bankruptcy Code section 105.