Earlier this month, this blog analyzed the preemption provisions of the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), which together regulate the labeling of meat and poultry products. We explained that trial courts in California and elsewhere routinely dismiss false advertising claims challenging statements on meat and poultry labels based on the statutes’ preemption provisions, which prohibit states from imposing requirements different from or in addition to federal law. Courts have specifically focused on the FMIA and PPIA’s pre-approval requirements in concluding that such challenges are preempted.
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Misbranded is Patterson Belknap’s blog covering false advertising litigation—both consumer class actions and competitor suits—with a particular focus on FDA-regulated products (foods/beverages, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and dietary supplements). Writing from the industry perspective, we provide timely updates on important cases, surveys of litigation trends, and in-depth analyses of “hot” legal issues. Our firm pioneered the modern practice of false advertising law more than 40 years ago, bringing the first competitor suits under the Lanham Act. In the decades since, we have continued to practice at the cutting edge, handling many of the field’s most groundbreaking cases on behalf of the nation’s best-known businesses. Today, led by Steven A. Zalesin, our team advocates creatively, strategically, and efficiently on behalf of our clients at all phases of litigation, from pre-complaint demands to Supreme Court appeals.
Did You See That? Defeating Class Certification Where Class Members Did Not See the Challenged Advertisement
In putative class actions alleging false advertising, plaintiffs often argue that class certification is appropriate because the language being challenged appeared on the defendant’s marketing materials or product label, thereby making the class members’ experience—and the question(s) to be resolved—common. These plaintiffs invariably claim that individualized questions of deception and reliance do not defeat certification, because consumer protection statutes employ an objective, “reasonable consumer” test that does not turn on what each individual class member actually thought or believed.
Over the past few months, federal courts throughout the country have stayed litigation challenging the labeling of products infused or made with cannabidiol, better known as CBD. These courts, acknowledging that labeling and product quality requirements for CBD products remain unclear, have cited the need to permit the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to promulgate uniform rules or regulations focused on CBD, which the agency has indicated are forthcoming in a series of recent administrative actions and public statements. Staying these cases affords FDA room to fashion a comprehensive regulatory framework in this still-novel industry, rather than allowing plaintiffs to usurp that role via the judicial process.
This blog has previously examined the recent spate of so-called “slack-fill” lawsuits, in which consumers claim that a food (or other) product is misleadingly packaged because it contains excess air. We noted that the growing trend is for courts to reject such suits at the motion-to-dismiss stage, for a variety of reasons. For example, courts have found slack-fill complaints deficient for failing to allege, beyond conclusory platitudes, that the package’s empty space serves no legitimate function, or for failing to allege with plausibility that a reasonable consumer would actually be deceived. Late last year, in Benson v. Fannie May Confections Brands, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an important decision affirming the pleadings-stage dismissal of a slack-fill suit, but based on a distinct justification: the failure to plausibly allege any cognizable damages associated with slack-filled packaging.
Joining the Trend: D.C. Circuit Latest Court of Appeals to Decline to Certify Class Containing Uninjured Members
A few weeks ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit weighed in on a recurring question in class action litigation: can a court certify a class where some class members—even if only a small fraction of the class—are uninjured? Joining a string of recent decisions on this subject, the circuit court held in In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 934 F.3d 619 (Aug. 30, 2019), that class certification was properly denied for lack of predominance because twelve percent of the proposed class—constituting thousands of proposed class members—were uninjured by the defendants’ alleged misconduct. This ruling follows a similar determination from the First Circuit last October, covered here. Although both cases involved antitrust allegations, their holdings are readily applicable to consumer product class actions, where there is often evidence—either from the defendants’ files or the plaintiffs’ own experts’ analysis—that a considerable number of proposed class members were uninjured by defendant’s alleged mislabeling.
Tough Nut to Crack: First Circuit Panel Splits on Reasonable Interpretation of Flavored Coffee Packaging
We have written previously about application of the “reasonable consumer” standard when labeling statements are claimed to be false or misleading, despite the presence of clarifying information elsewhere on the product label. We’ve observed the inconsistent standards courts apply in ruling on a motion to dismiss, particularly as to whether a “reasonable consumer” views the alleged misstatement in the context of the entire product packaging and ingredient list.
Another One Bytes the Dust: Court Dismisses Flash Drive False Advertising Suit Based On Back-Of-Package Clarifying Disclosures
A few months ago, we wrote about courts’ inconsistent application of the “reasonable consumer” standard when labeling statements are claimed to be false or misleading, despite clarifying information elsewhere on the product label. In Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit (in)famously held that a “reasonable consumer” should not be “expected to look beyond misleading representations on the front of the box to discover the truth … on the side of the box.” Id. at 939-40. As we explained in our prior post, Williams is in tension with longstanding authority that “reasonable consumers” are expected to read the entire advertisement, including disclaimers and clarifying language. We observed that numerous lower-court decisions, recognizing Williams’ shaky foundation, have sought to distinguish it and narrow it to its facts.
Add to this list Dinan v. SanDisk LLC, No. 5:18-cv-5420 (BLF), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91633 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2019), a recent decision out of the Northern District of California. While Dinan was not a food, drug, or cosmetic case, its discussion of Williams and the “reasonable consumer” test bears directly on such cases, and should help manufacturers dispatch some false advertising claims at the pleadings stage when their packages include proper clarifying disclosures.
As astronomer Carl Sagan famously said, “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Plaintiffs have not gotten the message. They often allege that a defendant’s marketing or labeling statements are false and misleading on the sole basis that there is purportedly no evidence (or insufficient evidence) proving their truth. These so-called “lack of substantiation” claims are easy to plead because a plaintiff does not need to conduct an investigation to identify evidence that the challenged statement is false. Rather, she alleges only an absence of supporting evidence for the statement—and generally, in a conclusory manner.
By law, packaged foods and beverages must bear an accurate list of their ingredients “in descending order of predominance by weight.” 21 C.F.R. § 101.4. Consumers routinely sue food and beverage companies alleging that they were misled about the presence or absence of particular ingredients—even though a mere glance at the ingredient list would have averted any confusion. Do such plaintiffs have a plausible claim for relief under false advertising laws, or should these claims be dismissed at the threshold?