Muhammad U. Faridi, Partner

So ruled Justice Andrea Masley of the Commercial Division in a recent summary judgment motion in the case Frenk v. Solomon, Index No. 650298/2013, holding that a standardized form release signed by the plaintiff’s mother in 1973 to settle a case primarily involving one piece of artwork barred the plaintiff’s present suit to recover other pieces of art that were believed lost at the time of the 1973 settlement.

On July 25, 2018, Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, Lawrence K. Marks, issued an administrative order promulgating Rule 9-a of the Commercial Division Rules. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 202.70.  The Rule, entitled “Immediate Trial or Pre-Trial Evidentiary Hearing,” encourages parties to move for a pre-trial evidentiary hearing or immediate trial on factual issues that could resolve a material part of the case. 

Since high net worth individuals often operate and own assets through LLCs and other business entities, including foreign corporate entities, a plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of a veil-piercing claim in order to attach assets owned by such entities.  Failing to do so could frustrate a plaintiff’s ability to satisfy a judgment, as illustrated by Commercial Division Justice Barry Ostrager’s recent decision in Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan.

In Rebecca Broadway LP v. Thibodeau, Justice Andrea Masley of the Commercial Division denied plaintiff Rebecca Broadway Limited Partnership’s (“RBLP”) motion to set aside a damages verdict after it prevailed at trial against Defendant Marc Thibodeau (“Thibodeau”) on claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with business relationships.[1] The case raised issues of whether a jury’s damages verdict is supported by a rational interpretation of the trial evidence and the circumstances under which a retrial solely on the issue of damages is appropriate.

Operating agreements often specify dilution as the remedy for a failure to make a capital contribution.  But what if your business partner fails to make a contribution and you’d rather have the capital than an increased ownership share? If the agreement only provides for dilution as a remedy, can you still sue for monetary damages? In Oneiric Holdings LLC v. Leonelli,[1] Justice Marcy Friedman held that under Delaware law, the answer to this question is an unambiguous “no.”

What legal standard applies to assess a corporate board’s refusal to pursue litigation in response to a shareholder’s demand to take “all necessary actions” to correct alleged director misconduct?  In Solak v. Fundaro,[i] Commercial Division Justice Charles Ramos applied the business judgment rule to such a situation, holding that a request to take “all necessary actions” constitutes as a shareholder demand under Rule 23.1 of the Delaware Chancery Court Rules and that a derivative plaintiff must plead particularized facts showing gross negligence or bad faith to proceed with a derivative claim following a board’s refusal to take the demanded action.

In a wave of rulemaking activity over the past week, the Office of Court Administration opened public comment on three significant changes to the Commercial Division Rules proposed by the Commercial Division Advisory Council.  The proposed rule changes would affect three major phases of commercial litigation: document discovery, evidentiary hearings, and motion practice.  Each proposed rule change aims at enhancing the efficiency with which parties litigate in the Commercial Division.

In WL Ross & Co. v. Storper, a recent Commercial Division decision involving the private equity firm founded by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, Justice Andrea Masley suggested that New York courts can disregard choice-of-law provisions if the law of the state specified by the choice-of-law provision is “substantively similar” to that of New York on the topic at issue.  Attorneys who routinely draft agreements that contain choice-of-law provisions would do well to take note of this decision, as it may imply that more careful attention should be paid to such provisions when New York law is best avoided for strategic reasons.

In 2017, the New York Commercial Division continued to implement new rules and refine existing rules in order to streamline litigation in the court.  The year also saw some key decisions by the Commercial Division as well as appellate courts reviewing Commercial Division cases that developed an area of commercial law or applied existing law to a new or interesting set of facts.  We covered all of these developments in this blog.  We present here brief summaries of the most salient Commercial Division rule changes and cases from 2017 with links to our blog posts that provide more in-depth coverage.

CPLR 3211(a)(1) allows a defendant to “move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that . . . a defense is founded upon documentary evidence.” 

On August 25, 2017, Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich of the New York Commercial Division entered an order reprimanding a high-profile lawyer, Mark Geragos, for misconduct during a deposition, including refusing to answer questions in violation of the court’s explicit instructions.  Gottwald v. Sebert, No. 653118/2014, 2017 BL 303419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2017).

In Del Forte USA, Inc. v. Blue Beverage Group, Inc. et al., No. 518454/2016, 2017 BL 253248 (Sup. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017), New York Commercial Division Justice Sylvia G. Ash denied plaintiff Del Forte’s preliminary injunction motion that sought, pursuant to N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law (“DCL”) § 279, to enjoin defendant Blue Beverage from selling 60% of Blue Beverage’s shares to co-defendant Kuzari Group for $5 million unless $500,000 is placed in escrow and a receiver is appointed.  As an alternative form of relief, Del Forte sought, pursuant to CPLR § 6201, to attach at least $500,000 from the asset sale to satisfy a judgment that might be rendered in Del Forte’s favor.

In PMC Aviation 2012-1 LLC et al. v. Jet Midwest Group, LLC et al., No. 654047/2015, BL221447 (Sup. Ct. Jun. 21, 2017), Commercial Division Justice Shirley Kornreich denied a motion to dismiss a fraudulent inducement claim by an LLC member against its business partner.  The court found that it could not find any “controlling, on-point authority” on the issue of reasonable reliance at issue in the case. The case relates to the scope of due-diligence obligations of LLC members when they rely upon the representations of business partners concerning the affairs of a jointly owned company.

Justice Shirley Kornreich recently issued one of the few New York state court decisions  that address the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).  Spec Simple, Inc. v. Designer Pages Online LLC,  No. 651860/2015, 2017 BL 160865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 10, 2017).  The CFAA criminalizes both accessing a computer without authorization and exceeding authorized access and thereby obtaining information from any protected computer.  Id. at *3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C)). The CFAA also provides a civil cause of action to any person who suffers damage or loss because of a violation of the CFAA.  Id. at *4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)).  As discussed below, the decision provides a helpful look into the interpretation of CFAA claims in the future.

Justice Anil Singh of the New York Commercial Division recently issued two decisions related to the long-running litigation between Russian businessmen Alexander Gliklad and Michael Cherney.  Gliklad v. Deripaska, No. 652641/2015, 2017 BL 137121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017); Moquinon Ltd. v. Gliklad, No. 650366/2017, 2017 BL 137162 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 6, 2017).  Both decisions dealt setbacks to Gliklad’s ability to collect after winning a $385 million judgment.

In a pair of recent decisions, Justices Shirley W. Kornreich and Lawrence K. Marks of the Commercial Division ruled that creditors could proceed on their fraudulent conveyance claims seeking reversal of asset transfers made by debtors under New York’s Debtor and Creditor Law (“DCL”).  The decisions highlight two basic theories of fraudulent conveyance claims permitted by the DCL:  intentional fraud claims, which require a showing that the debtor made the transfer with the intent defrauding its creditor, and constructive fraud claims, which do not require a showing of fraudulent intent.

Justice Timothy J. Dufficy in the Queens County Commercial Division recently entered an order dissolving a limited liability company owned by two brothers whose disagreements regarding the management of the LLC culminated in a physical altercation.  Matter of Dissolution of 47th Road LLC, No. 705060/16, 2017 BL 49187 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 16, 2017).  The court applied an exception to the general rule that disputes between members are insufficient to warrant judicial dissolution, and found that the antagonism between the brothers made it impracticable for the business to carry on.

In a recent decision, Justice Lawrence S. Knipel in the Commercial Division ordered an attorney to comply with a non-party subpoena and disqualified the same attorney from representing her client in the action pursuant to the Advocate-Witness Rule of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct due to the fact that the lawyer was likely to be a witness on a significant issue of fact in the case.  Vanderbilt Brookland LLC v. Vanderbilt Myrtle Inc., No. 500522/2014, 2016 BL 433294 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 23 2016).   

In Ace Decade Holdings Ltd. v. UBS AG, No. 653316/2015, 2016 BL 413780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 7, 2016), Justice Eileen Bransten of the Commercial Division dismissed a $500 million fraud suit brought by an investment holding company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, Ace Decade Holdings Ltd. (“Ace Decade”), against the Swiss Bank UBS AG for lack of personal jurisdiction and inconvenient forum.  Justice Bransten found no basis to exercise jurisdiction over UBS for alleged fraud in connection with a financing deal negotiated in Hong Kong to purchase shares of a firm listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Justice Bransten further held that, even if the court could exercise jurisdiction over UBS, the causes of action lack a substantial nexus with New York and, thus, dismissal is also warranted based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

On October 27, 2016, Chief Judge Janet DiFiore delivered a much awaited opinion in Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB.[1]  Judge Leslie Stein wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Judge Eugene Pigott, Jr.  Justinian involves the issue of champerty, which, as the Court describes, is “the purchase of notes, securities, or other instruments or claims with the intent and for the primary purpose of bringing a lawsuit.”[2]  Under New York law, champerty is prohibited.[3]  However, the New York champerty statute provides for a safe-harbor when the purchased asset has an “aggregate purchase price of at least five hundred thousand dollars.”[4]  Justinian clarifies that this safe harbor only applies when either the party pays “the purchase price or [has] a binding and bona fide obligation to pay the purchase price.”[5]  Put simply, at least $500,000 of the transaction must not be contingent on the litigation in order to fall within the safe harbor.

This week’s Latin lesson: in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis means that if both parties are in the wrong, then the defendant’s position is stronger. 

When the winner of the 11th season of American Idol, Phillip Phillips, sang “I’m going to make this place your home” on his 2012 breakout single, “Home,” he may have been predicting the petition that he would later file with the California Labor Commission (“CLC”).  In that petition, Phillips sought to void the talent management agreement that he was required to sign with 19 Entertainment, Inc. – one of the now-bankrupt companies behind production of American Idol – in order to participate as a semifinalist on the show.  Following a September 23, 2016 decision by Commercial Division Justice Salinan Scarpulla staying 19 Entertainment’s suit against Phillips’ new talent manager pending resolution of the California proceeding, the CLC may be “home” for 19 Entertainment’s fight over Phillips for the foreseeable future.

Industry jargon becomes second nature to those in the industry.  Wall Street knows “poison pills” and Silicon Valley knows “burn rates.”  But what is second nature to industry insiders may be entirely foreign to others, and courts have set a high bar for allowing industry custom to color their interpretation of contracts.  Two recent decisions of the New York Commercial Division underscore the danger of relying on custom and usage to supply meaning to contract terms.  See Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. IVC WH HG II, LLC, No. 652178/2012, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 31, 2016) and IFC v. Carrera Holdings Inc., No. 601705/2007, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2640 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2016).