Category: Shareholder Derivative Litigation
On April 27, 2018, Justice Barry Ostrager of the Commercial Division enjoined a no-cash transaction that would have granted Fujifilm (“Fuji”) a 50.1% controlling interest in Xerox. Just days after the Court’s decision an agreement was reached whereby the CEO of Xerox, Jeff Jacobson, and six other current Xerox board members would step down from their positions, ceding control of the company to representatives of investors Carl Icahn and Darwin Deason. Shortly thereafter, Xerox reversed course, indicating publically that Jacobson would stay on as CEO. However, ultimately Xerox entered into a settlement agreement with Icahn and Deason resulting in the resignation of Jacobson and the scuttling of the Fuji Deal.
What legal standard applies to assess a corporate board’s refusal to pursue litigation in response to a shareholder’s demand to take “all necessary actions” to correct alleged director misconduct? In Solak v. Fundaro,[i] Commercial Division Justice Charles Ramos applied the business judgment rule to such a situation, holding that a request to take “all necessary actions” constitutes as a shareholder demand under Rule 23.1 of the Delaware Chancery Court Rules and that a derivative plaintiff must plead particularized facts showing gross negligence or bad faith to proceed with a derivative claim following a board’s refusal to take the demanded action.
On February 8, 2018, Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich of the Commercial Division rejected a disclosure-only class action settlement in City Trading Fund v. Nye, 2018 BL 44689 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 08, 2018). The settlement provided for additional disclosures to shareholders in a proxy statement plus $500,000 in attorneys’ fees and expenses for plaintiffs’ counsel. As discussed below, the Commercial Division’s rejection of this disclosure-only settlement is one of the first applications of the First Department’s new standard for reviewing such settlements of merger challenge litigations.
Second Department Affirms Commercial Division Decisions Leaving Withdrawing LLC Members Without Compensation for Their Membership Interests or Derivative Standing
In Matter of Jacobs v. Cartalemi, No. 2016-05041, 2017 BL 435890 (2d Dep’t Dec. 6, 2017) (“Jacobs I”), a unanimous Appellate Division, Second Department panel affirmed an order by Westchester County Commercial Division Justice Linda S. Jamieson denying compensation to a withdrawing LLC member. The court held that a provision of an LLC operating agreement governing the sale of membership interests superseded the default rule of New York Limited Liability Company (“LLC Law”) § 509, entitling a member to “the fair value of his or her membership interest” upon withdrawal from the LLC. Jacobs I was decided along with two related appeals in which the panel also dismissed various derivative claims brought by the former minority member of Westchester Industrial Complex, LLC against the company and its majority member, applying the continuous ownership rule to find that the minority member lost standing to bring derivative claims upon his withdrawal from the company. See Jacobs v. Cartalemi, No. 2016-07813, 2017 BL 436813 (2d Dep’t Dec. 6, 2017) (“Jacobs II”); Jacobs v. Westchester Indus. Complex, LLC, No. 2016-07817, 2017 BL 436677 (2d Dep’t Dec. 6, 2017) (“Jacobs III”).
A shareholder bringing a contested derivative claim in the Cayman Islands must seek leave from the court before proceeding. This litigation prerequisite -- imposed by Rule 12A of the Rules of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (“Rule 12A”) -- requires a prima facie factual showing, with the aim of protecting corporations from “vexatious or unfounded litigation.” But when a Cayman Islands-related derivative claim is brought in New York’s Commercial Division, does the same rule apply? The New York Court of Appeals recently answered “No,” holding in Davis v. Scottish Re Group Ltd. that Rule 12A is a procedural rule that does not apply to matters litigated in New York courts.
The decision to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a corporation is entrusted to the corporation’s board of directors. A shareholder may not maintain a derivative lawsuit on behalf of a corporation without first making a demand on the board to bring the suit or pleading that it would be futile to make such a demand. On October 18, 2017, Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich of the New York Commercial Division dismissed a derivative lawsuit because the shareholder failed to allege that the defendant corporation’s board of directors acted in bad faith or with gross negligence when it rejected the shareholder’s demand. Reese v. Andreotti, No. 654132/2016, 2017 BL 391404, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2017).
Commercial Division Rejects Third-Party Claim as Derivative in Trusts’ Suit Concerning Upper West Side Beaux-Arts Building
Asserting a claim on behalf of a trust in the Commercial Division can be risky, as the party asserting the claim must establish that the claimed injury is independent of any injury to the trust, and that they are therefore not simply bringing a derivative claim. Recently, in 1993 Trust of Joan Cohen v. Baum, No. 150058/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op 30894(U), 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1667 (May 2). Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich dismissed as derivative a third-party claim brought by a former trustee of two trusts against an individual who allegedly provided deficient tax advice to the trusts. The court ruled that the former trustee was owed no duty by the third-party defendant individually and could no longer prosecute claims that belonged to the trusts. Justice Kornreich also rejected the former trustee’s contribution claim against the tax adviser and another entity, explaining that those entities’ alleged wrongdoing was unrelated to the former trustee’s alleged wrongdoing, and thus did not make them subject to liability to the plaintiff for damages for the same injury.
Commercial Division Reaffirms Distinction Between Direct Versus Derivative Claims Under Delaware Law
When can a shareholder bring a direct claim in the Commercial Division against a corporate officer under Delaware law? On September 29, 2016, in Southern Advanced Materials LLC v. Abrams, No. 650773/2015, 2016 BL 331371 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.), Justice Saliann Scarpulla of the Commercial Division ruled on a corporate officer’s motion to dismiss breach of contract and fraudulent inducement claims brought by a plaintiff shareholder. In his ruling, Justice Scarpulla articulated the distinction between direct and derivative claims under Delaware law, and applied that law to four contract and fraud claims brought by a shareholder against corporate officer. Justice Scarpulla’s opinion provides guidance to litigants addressing shareholder claims against corporate officers in the Commercial Division.
In Casey Capital, LLC v. Levy, the Commercial Division provides a cautionary tale for derivative shareholder plaintiffs alleging demand futility
Activist investors are an increasing presence on the stock ledgers and in the boardrooms of public companies. Since 2010, one in seven companies on the S&P 500 has faced an activist shareholder challenge. But activists can encounter pitfalls when they seek to challenge incumbents through derivative litigation, as illustrated by the recent Commercial Division decision in Casey Capital, LLC v. Levy, C.A. No. 652805/15, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 2016) (Scarpulla, J.).