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Category: Trials and Evidentiary Rulings

Second Circuit Sheds Light On Voir Dire Challenges

In United States v. Mendlowitz, the Second Circuit (Kearse, Pooler, and Menashi) issued a summary order in which the panel affirmed the defendant-appellant’s conviction for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. In so doing, the Court determined that the district court had not erred when it failed to ask specifically about potential antisemitic bias during voir dire. The Court also rejected Mendlowitz’s other arguments regarding the exclusion of expert witness testimony as well as the exclusion of a recording of Mendlowitz during trial, finding those to be harmless error individually and cumulatively. While this is a non-precedential summary order, the Court’s ruling sheds light on how the Court of Appeals views voir dire challenges. This is especially notable in the immediate aftermath of the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Nieves, where the Second Circuit reversed for the first time a conviction for the failure to ask a particular question of prospective jurors.

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Second Circuit Provides Guidance on Courtroom Design, Predicate Offenses, and the First Step Act

In United States v. Eldridge, the Second Circuit (Chin, Sullivan, Nardini) affirmed the convictions of a group of co-defendants who were indicted on a litany of charges, many of which related to the attempted robbery of a rival dealer.  This appeal concerned two of them, Thamud Eldridge and Kevin Allen, who raised three arguments: (1) that the placement of a waist-high curtain around the defense table during the trial prejudiced the jury; (2) that one of the convictions ought to be vacated in light of recent Supreme Court precedent; and (3) that the First Step Act qualifies the defendants for a sentence reduction. 

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Aggravated Identity Theft Conviction Affirmed Despite Ambiguous Statutory Language

In United States v. Wedd, the Second Circuit (Cabranes, Park, Nardini), affirmed the defendant’s 2018 convictions for aggravated identity theft (among other offenses), which arose from a scheme to auto-subscribe customers to pricey premium text messaging services.  In the process, the Second Circuit—enhancing a circuit split—rejected Wedd’s argument that the scheme involved no “use[]” of a means of identification of another person, a requisite for conviction under the aggravated identity theft statute.  The panel also rejected Wedd’s contentions that the district court erred in giving a conscious avoidance instruction and in failing to recuse itself from his (third) trial.

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Circuit Affirms Convictions in College Basketball Corruption Case in Split Decision

In United States v. Gatto, the Second Circuit (Lynch, Chin, and Engelmayer, sitting by designation) issued a decision on January 15, 2021 affirming the wire-fraud convictions of James Gatto, Merl Code, and Christian Dawkins in the high-profile college basketball corruption prosecution that was tried in the Southern District of New York in October 2018.  Judge Lynch wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which addressed his disagreement with the majority concerning certain evidentiary rulings.  These evidentiary rulings were a key issue at trial and were the focus of the Court’s decision and Judge Lynch’s opinion.

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Circuit Upholds FIFA Convictions, Denying Extraterritoriality and Vagueness Challenges

In United States v. Napout, the Second Circuit (Sack, Hall and Bianco) affirmed the 2017 convictions of Juan Ángel Napout and José Maria Marin in the Eastern District of New York on charges arising out of commercial bribery related to the International Federation of Association Football (“FIFA”) scandal.  The Circuit rejected all of the defendants’ arguments:  the Circuit held that (i) that there had not been an impermissible extraterritorial application of the wire fraud statute, and (ii) the honest service wire fraud statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to them.  The Circuit also denied challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and several trial rulings.  Judge Hall wrote a short concurring opinion that addressed one aspect of the parties’ contentions relating to their vagueness challenge.

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Second Circuit Holds Constitutional Challenge to Prosecution Was Untimely

In United States v. O’Brien, the Second Circuit (Kearse, Livingston, Carney) affirmed the conviction of Michael O’Brien for importing and possessing with intent to distribute methylone and anabolic steroids.  The Court held that (1) the District Court properly denied O’Brien’s suppression motion based on the fact that he was experiencing drug withdrawal symptoms at the time of his arrest, (2) the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain O’Brien’s conviction, and (3) O’Brien failed to timely raise his defense that methylone was designated as a controlled substance through an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional legislative authority to the Attorney General and the DEA.

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Appeal “Tanks” After Circuit Holds That Defendant Gave Implied Consent to Have K-9 Unit Present in His Apartment After Calling 911 to Report Prowler

On July 31, the Second Circuit issued a decision in United States v. Iverson (Kearse, Calabresi, Livingston) and affirmed the conviction of a defendant who had challenged the district court’s denial of his suppression motion and the district court’s mid-trial decision to excuse one of two black persons on the jury for cause right before summations based on an interview of the juror conducted in camera.  The decision presents an interesting set of facts and applies established law in the Second Circuit.

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Court Rejects MS-13 Gang Member’s Challenge to Conviction and Sentence

In United States v. Hernandez, 16-2765, the Second Circuit (Kearse, Cabranes, Lohier) affirmed the conviction of a member of La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a street gang that operates in certain parts of the country, arising out of an initiation shooting in Brentwood. 

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Be Careful Where You Park: Circuit Finds No Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Common Residential Lot

Earlier this year, in Collins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement does not authorize “a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a vehicle parked therein.”  138 S.Ct. 1663, 1668 (2018).  Earlier this week, in United States v. Jones, No. 16-87 (Jacobs, Cabranes, Raggi) (June 19, 2018), the Circuit had its first opportunity to grapple with the import of Collins.  But it had little difficulty finding that a vehicle parked in a common lot shared by multi-family apartment buildings is not entitled to the same expectation of privacy as a vehicle parked “within the curtilage of one’s home,” and in a published opinion, affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress.  In a separate summary order, the Circuit addressed and disposed of the defendant’s other arguments, and affirmed his conviction and sentence in full.  

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Second Circuit Affirms Constitutionality of Arms Export Control Act

In United States v. Mark Henry, the Second Circuit (Jacobs, Cabranes, and Wesley, Js.) affirmed that the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq., does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch, in addition to addressing various issues of trial procedure.  The defendant, Mark Henry, appealed his 2014 conviction following a jury trial of violating and attempting to violate the AECA by exporting “ablative materials”—military-grade technology used in rockets and missiles—and microwave amplifiers to customers in Taiwan and China.  The AECA prohibits the exportation of ablative materials, microwave amplifiers, and other “defense articles” except pursuant to a license issued by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, a division of the U.S. Department of State.  The government presented evidence at trial that the defendant was aware of the need for an export license, that he did not have such a license, and that instead of acquiring a license the defendant took steps to conceal his exportation of restricted materials through the use of intermediaries, fictitious companies, and falsified documents, among other things.  The court allowed the defendant, who is from China and primarily speaks Mandarin, to testify at trial in English through the help of a standby interpreter, although the court otherwise required a translator to assist the defendant throughout the trial.

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Takeaways From 2nd Circ. Reversal Of Litvak Conviction

In United States v. Litvak, the Second Circuit (Winter, Chin, Korman D.J.) reversed the conviction of Jesse Litvak, a securities trader at investment bank Jefferies & Co., for securities fraud premised on Litvak’s misrepresentations to trading counterparties about Jefferies’ profits on the transaction. The Court held that the district court improperly admitted testimony that Litvak’s counterparty believed that Litvak was acting as his fiduciary agent—even though in fact no such relation existed.  The Court explained that the counterparty’s erroneous, subjective belief was irrelevant as to the objective materiality of the misstatement, but likely swayed the jury in convicting.  The decision also raises interesting questions about expectations between traders and their customers, and the Government’s role in policing that relationship. For our discussion and commentary on this decision, please see our article on Law 360.

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Missing Texts, Unfair Trial: Second Circuit Remands Case for Possible Brady Violations and Sentencing Irregularities

In United States v. Djibo, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a judgment of conviction entered in the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.) following the defendant’s trial on charges arising from an international heroin-smuggling conspiracy.  In a summary order by Judges Sack, Hall, and Droney, the Circuit concluded that errors had affected both the trial and the sentencing, and reassigned the case to a new judge on remand.

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Conviction reversed by summary order for improper rebuttal summation

In United States v. Ballard, 17-427-cr, the Second Circuit reversed a sex trafficking conviction by summary order (JAC, RR, Villardo, J. by designation) due to improper argument by the government during rebuttal summation.

The Court rejected the defendant’s arguments that some of the rhetoric in the government’s main summation amounted to error.  Defense counsel did not object to these comments, which included calling the defendant a “dead beat,” a “pimp,” and similar to “Genghis Khan or some other Wall Street person.”

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Second Circuit Remands for New Trial Based on District Court’s Improper Exclusion of Advice-of-Counsel Testimony

In United States v. Scully, 16-3073-cr (Pooler, Lynch, Cogan[1]), the Second Circuit vacated the defendant’s conviction for various offenses, including mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United States, the sale of misbranded and unapproved drugs, and the unlicensed wholesale distribution of prescription drugs, finding that the District Court erred in excluding evidence related to his advice-of-counsel defense.  The opinion provides a helpful overview of the requirements of Rule 403 balancing and the nature of the burden in establishing an advice-of-counsel defense.

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The Klansman and His Death Ray: Second Circuit Affirms Conviction and Sentence in Bizarre Domestic Terrorism Plot

In United States v. Crawford, 16-4261-cr (Kearse, Cabranes, Wesley), the Second Circuit affirmed via summary order the terrorism-related conviction and sentence of a Klansman in upstate New York. This case represented the first conviction under the 2004 law barring the acquisition and use of so-called “dirty bombs” and provided a rare opportunity for the Circuit to interpret several terrorism statutes. It is most notable, however, for its bizarre fact pattern—involving Ku Klux Klan business cards, a modified x-ray machine, and a plot to kill President Barack Obama and an unknown number of Muslims. In August 2015, Glendon Scott Crawford—a Navy veteran and an avowed member of the Ku Klux Klan—was convicted of several counts of domestic terrorism and was subsequently sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for his crimes.

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Skelos Vacated: For The Second Time This Year, Conviction Of Leading New York State Legislator Is Undone Due To McDonnell

The Second Circuit (Winter, Raggi, Hellerstein by designation) today vacated by summary order the convictions of former New York State Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos and his son Adam Skelos.  Dean and Adam Skelos were convicted of Hobbs Act conspiracy and substantive offenses, honest services wire fraud conspiracy, and federal program bribery, after a jury trial in which the government presented evidence that the elder Skelos had taken official actions to benefit certain companies in exchange for payments to his son.  Much like the conviction of his fellow senior state legislator, Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, the conviction was reversed in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), which narrowed the definition of an “official act.”  As the Court rejected the defense contention that insufficient evidence supported the convictions, both Skelos and his son will be retried by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.  Like the Silver reversal, this ruling reflects the ways in which the McDonnell decision has complicated that office’s investigation and prosecution of public corruption in New York state government.

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Affirmance in Drug Conspiracy Trial Considers Sufficiency of the Indictment and Evidentiary Rulings

United States v. Gill, No. 15-4444-cr(L) (Livingston, Chin, Carney), a decision in a drug trafficking and murder conspiracy appeal, offers several interesting rulings on evidentiary and trial practice issues that arose out of a 4-week trial.  As we often see, these decisions may originate in the world of violence crime and narcotics, but the legal rules established in these cases will also apply in the world of business crimes.

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Newman’s “Meaningfully Close Personal Relationship” Requirement No Longer Good Law

A divided Second Circuit panel (Katzmann, Pooler (dissenting), Chin) on Wednesday upheld the insider trading conviction of former SAC Capital portfolio manager Mathew Martoma.  Confronting its precedent in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), for the first time since the Supreme Court struck down part of the Newman tippee liability standard this past December, see Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016), the Court ruled that the “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement of Newman is no longer good law.  See United States v. Martoma, 14-3599 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2017). 

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Divided Second Circuit Panel Upholds Martoma Conviction, Ruling that Newman’s “Meaningfully Close Personal Relationship” Requirement Is No Longer Good Law After Salman

In a highly anticipated decision, a divided Second Circuit panel (Katzmann, Pooler (dissenting), Chin) today upheld the insider trading conviction of former SAC Capital portfolio manager Mathew Martoma, ruling that the “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement set out by the Court in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), does not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). See United States v. Martoma, 14-3599 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2017).

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Convictions Affirmed in Drug Robbery Conspiracy

In United States v. Martinez, Nos. 14-2759, 15-511, 15-836, 15-1001, 15-3699 (Kearse, Jacobs, Pooler), issued on July 7, the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions of several co-conspirators in a decade-long scheme where at least two dozen individuals allegedly committed over 200 drug robberies by impersonating police officers who “arrested” drug traffickers and “seized” cash and drugs. 

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Second Circuit Rejects Novel Due Process Challenge to Rule Permitting Evidence of Prior Sexual Assaults

The Second Circuit joined its sister circuits and upheld the constitutionality Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which renders admissible propensity evidence about the defendant in sexual assault cases.  In United States v. Schaffer, 15-2516-cr (Walker, Cabranes, Berman[1]) the Circuit rejected as a matter of first impression the defendant’s argument that Rule 413 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The Court also reviewed its jurisprudence on “custodial” interrogation in the course of affirming the admissibility of incriminating statements the defendant made to law enforcement agents prior to his arrest.

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Court Upholds Murder-for-Hire Conviction, Rejects Fourth Amendment Challenges

The murder-for-hire statute makes it a crime to agree to commit murder in exchange for “anything of pecuniary value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1958. The Second Circuit has understood this language to require that, at the time of the agreement, there was a quid pro quo or at least the promise of some pecuniary consideration. In United States v. Babilonia, No. 14-3739, the Court (Chin, Carney, and Cogan, sitting by designation) reaffirmed this “pecuniary consideration” requirement, but then suggested it presents a minimal hurdle where there was payment after the fact.[1]

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Court Affirms Conviction In Case Involving $126 Million Loan For Shopping Mall Transaction, Rejecting Argument That Sentence Should Be Lowered Because Of The Financial Crisis

In a summary order on March 8, 2017, the Second Circuit (Katzmann, C.J. and Pooler and Lynch, J.) affirmed the conviction and sentence for wire fraud in United States v. Frenkel. The case attracted some public attention because Frenkel’s co-conspirator, Mark Stern, was a cooperating witness in a number of public corruption cases brought by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. The underlying facts involved Frenkel’s fraudulent inducement of Citigroup to lend $126 million to finance the purchase of shopping malls. Although the decision has no precedential value, it presented four interesting issues.

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Divided Panel Debates a Jury’s Ability to Resist the Persuasive Power of Hollywood

In United States v. Monsalvatge (Nos. 14-1113, 14-1139, and 14-1206), a divided panel of the Second Circuit explored the contentious topic of introducing blockbuster films as evidence in a criminal prosecution.  Defendants Akeem Monsalvatge, Edward Byam, and Derrick Dunkley were tried and convicted of committing (and conspiring to commit) two armed robberies of Pay-O-Matic check-cashing stores in Queens.  The robberies occurred nearly two years apart—in 2010 and 2012—and there were significant differences in the manner in which each crime was carried out.  The government believed that these differences were attributable to the fact that the defendants admired and were inspired by the 2010 Hollywood crime thriller, The Town, and altered their modus operandi to carry out the 2012 robbery in a manner resembling the crimes committed in the film.  At trial, the district court permitted the government to play for the jury several brief clips from The Town, in order to highlight the similarities between the film and the 2012 robbery.  On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these clips into evidence.  Judge Livingston authored an opinion joined by Judge Droney; District Judge Analisa Torres, sitting by designation, found the introduction of the clips inappropriate but ultimately concurred in the judgment based on a finding of harmless error.[1]

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Return to Sender: Aéropostale Employee’s Fraud Convictions Affirmed, But Restitution Order Sent Back for Recalculation

Aéropostale is known by many as a staple of adolescent wardrobes and shopping-mall standard.  But as a patsy for kickback schemes?  In United States v. Finazzo, 14-3213-cr, 14-3330-cr (Droney, J., joined by Judges Sack and Chin), issued March 7, 2017, the Circuit affirmed the mail and wire fraud convictions of an Aéropostale executive who, over the course of a decade, steered hundreds of millions of dollars in business to a vendor that cut him in on the profits.  In affirming his convictions, the Court held that the defendant’s deprivation of Aéropostale’s right to control its assets was injury sufficient under the mail and wire fraud statutes, and that the district court had adequately instructed the jury that such deprivation must be able to cause tangible economic harm.  However, the panel vacated and remanded the district court’s restitution order on the grounds that the calculations presumed that any financial gain to defendant through the scheme was a loss to Aéropostale.  With little more direction than to “try again,” the court instructed the district court to develop a new methodology for computing a restitutionary award that subtracts any legitimate value that Aéropostale derived through its dealing with the vendor.  The Circuit has long stressed the need for precision in restitution calculations, and it can be difficult to make such calculations in a kickback case prosecuted under a theory based on the deprivation of the right to control assets.

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If It Looks Like a Bomb, and Explodes Like a Bomb . . . : The Court Finds Model Pipe Bomb Is a Destructive Device

Is a pipe bomb that exploded a “destructive device”?   Though it may seem like a trick question, in United States v. Sheehan, 15-2028-cr (Lynch, J., joined by Judges Winter and Wesley), issued September 23, 2016, the Court spends most of its 44-page decision grappling with whether a bomb built and planted by the defendant was an “explosive bomb” (or a “combination of parts” from an explosive bomb could readily be assembled) such that it qualifies as a destructive device under Section 924.  The Government (and common sense) prevailed:  the Court concluded that, indeed, this exploding bomb was an explosive bomb.

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Gimme Shelter, But One With Economic Substance

The line that separates lawful tax shelters from unlawful ones is notoriously hazy, particularly at the margins.  There is little question, however, that a transaction that serves no meaningful business purpose other than to reduce one’s tax liability will be treated as an illegitimate tax shelter.

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Defining the Terms: What Constitutes a “Federally Insured Financial Institution” Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 or a “Bank” Under 18 U.S.C. § 1014?

In United States v. Bouchard, 14-4156, the Court (Parker, J., Lynch, J., and Lohier, J.) reversed the conviction of defendant Michael Bouchard after finding that the Government’s evidence only showed that Bouchard had made false statements in order to defraud BNC Mortgage (“BNC”), a mortgage lender that did not fall within the Title 18 definition of a “federally insured financial institution” or “bank” as would be required by statute for a conviction. 

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The Second Circuit Affirms the Convictions of the “Madoff Five” in a 29-page Summary Order

In United States v. Bonventre, 14-4714-cr (April. 20, 2016) (JMW, RR, CFD), the Court affirmed by summary order the convictions of five former employees of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (the “Appellants”) convicted in the Southern District of New York (Swain, J.)  for multiple counts of conspiratorial and substantive securities fraud, bank fraud, and records falsification; making false SEC and IRS filings; obstructing enforcement of tax laws; and tax evasion. 

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