Independent Examiner in FTX Bankruptcy Case
Firm Serves as Counsel to the Examiner
This article originally appeared in The Bankruptcy Strategist.
At the motion to dismiss stage, courts usually won't consider affirmative defenses. This issue arose recently in a preferential transfer case, where a defendant sought to dismiss a complaint by arguing it was a mere conduit, not an initial transferee. But the court ruled against the defendant, explaining why it would not adjudicate a mere conduit defense on a motion to dismiss. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Pack Liquidating, LLC v. Kepler Grp., LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23-50536 (In re Pack Liquidating, LLC), Case No. 22-10797, 2024 Bankr. LEXIS 2444 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 4, 2024).
Before their bankruptcy filings, the debtors sold consumer products online. The defendant in the preference action was an e-marketing services provider and an alleged agent of the debtors. In the debtors' Chapter 11 cases, the unsecured creditors' committee (Committee) sued the defendant to recover $389,000 transferred from the debtors. The complaint alleged that the defendant was the initial transferee of the funds. The complaint asserted a preferential transfer claim under Bankruptcy Code section 547 and a constructive fraudulent transfer claim under Bankruptcy Code section 548. The complaint also sought recovery from the defendant under Bankruptcy Code section 550.
The defendant licensed and installed advertising campaigns for the debtors that the defendant obtained from a third-party service provider. The service provider would bill the defendant for its services, then the defendant would invoice the debtors that amount plus a fee for its own work. The defendant would pay the service provider when the debtors paid the defendant.
The defendant moved to dismiss to complaint. When analyzing a motion to dismiss, the court explained, "courts should separate the factual and legal elements of a claim, accepting only the well-pleaded facts as true while disregarding any legal conclusions. And … courts should determine whether the facts alleged, assuming them to be true, give rise to a plausible claim for relief." 2024 Bankr. LEXIS 2444, at *16. A complaint must set forth a "short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In addition, "[Fed.R.Civ.P.] 9 requires particularly when a plaintiff alleges fraud or mistake, but intent and knowledge may be alleged generally." 2024 Bankr. LEXIS 2444, at *15.
The defendant's motion to dismiss argued that it was a mere conduit of the funds transferred from the debtor and to the service provider. "To be a 'mere conduit,' a defendant must establish that it lacked dominion and control over the transfer because the payment simply passed through its hands and it had no power to redirect the funds to its own use." In re Lenox Healthcare, Inc., 343 B.R. 96, 103 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "Where the defendant is 'not under any contractual or other obligation to use [transferred funds] for the benefit of [third parties],' but rather may use the funds freely, it is not a 'mere conduit.'" Id. at 104 (quoting In re 360networks (USA) Inc., 338 B.R. 194, 202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
Although courts typically don't consider the mere conduit affirmative defense on a motion to dismiss, there is an exception: when the allegations in a complaint demonstrate the existence of the mere conduit defense, the court will analyze its applicability. But in Pack Liquidating, the court concluded the complaint and documents the defendant submitted with its motion to dismiss did not support application of the exception.
The defendant argued in favor of the mere conduit defense based on the sequence of payments made from the debtors to the defendant to the service provider. The defendant asserted that its obligation to pay the service provider: 1) arose only when the debtors paid the defendant; and 2) depended on the amount the defendant received from the debtors.
The Committee argued that the motion to dismiss should be denied because "fact-intensive" discovery was needed. At issue would be the defendant's "dominion and control" over the transferred funds: whether the funds were placed in the defendant's operating account and were commingled with other funds; whether the funds the defendant received from the debtor were the same funds the defendant used to pay the service provider; and whether the defendant had discretion over when and how much to pay the service provider.
Given that: 1) the factual record that needed to be developed; and 2) that the complaint did not allege facts that gave rise to the mere conduit defense, the court refused to dismiss the complaint based on the assertion of the defense.
An additional point addressed in the court's decision, which was unrelated to the mere conduit defense, is worth a brief mention. As noted above, the Committee also asserted a constructive fraudulent transfer claim pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 548. The defendant moved to dismiss this claim on the grounds that the complaint: 1) didn't plead that the debtors failed to receive reasonably equivalent value for the alleged transfer; and 2) didn't show that the debtors were insolvent at the time of the transfer.
The court rejected both arguments. First, if the evidence produced later in discovery were to demonstrate the transfer was on account of an antecedent debt — a key element of a preference claim — then the constructive fraud claim would fail. As the court noted, "satisfaction of a viable debt would constitute reasonably equivalent value." 2024 Bankr. LEXIS 2444, at *24. Thus, the court ruled, the constructive fraudulent claim was sufficiently pled in the alternative to the preference claim.
Second, the court noted that the complaint alleged insolvency, and that the debtors lacked sufficient liquidity and were incurring debts beyond their ability to pay. The court also observed that the complaint referenced statements from the debtors' first day declaration filed in the bankruptcy cases that set forth facts about the debtors' alleged insolvency. The court ruled that reference to this material in the complaint was sufficient to defeat the defendant's arguments about the insolvency prong of the claim.
Section 548 of the bankruptcy code authorizes a trustee, debtor, or other appropriate party to avoid actual and constructive fraudulent transfers that occurred prepetition. In order to prove that a transfer was an actual fraudulent transfer, the trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) must prove that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which to debtor was or became…indebted.” 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A). In order to prove that a transfer was a constructive fraudulent transfer, the trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) may instead show that the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value and was insolvent at the time of the transfer. See 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(B).
Plaintiffs asserting actual fraudulent transfer claims often rely on the so-called badges of fraud, but intent can still be difficult to prove. To make matters worse, these claims must often meet a heightened pleading standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b).
In some cases, however, there is another way to prove intent. Courts around the country have found that if a trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) proves that the debtor operated a Ponzi scheme, then that is sufficient to prove the debtor’s intent to defraud creditors. The basis for this presumption is that the mastermind responsible for operating a Ponzi scheme knows that the scheme will fall apart as soon as the pool of new investors inevitably runs dry.
In one recent decision, the Ninth Circuit described this presumption as both “long-standing” and “irrebuttable.” See In re EPD Inv. Co., LLC, 114 F.4th 1148, 1152 & 1157 (9th Cir. 2024). The Ninth Circuit also embraced a definition of “Ponzi scheme” that contains “two essential elements: (1) the funneling of money from new investors to pay old investors, and (2) no legitimate profit-making business opportunity exists for investors.” Id.at 1159.
Other courts have applied a four-factor test: “1) deposits were made by investors; 2) the Debtor conducted little or no legitimate business operations as represented to investors; 3) the purported business operation of the Debtor produced little or no profits or earnings; and 4) the source of payments to investors was from cash infused by new investors.” Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 603 B.R. 682, 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (collecting cases). But the result is essentially the same: the term “Ponzi scheme” applies to “any sort of inherently fraudulent arrangement under which the debtor-transferor must utilize after-acquired investment funds to pay off previous investors in order to forestall disclosure of the fraud.” Id.
Allegations of a Ponzi scheme may also help a trustee plead or prove insolvency for the purposes of a constructive fraudulent conveyance claim. See In re DBSI, Inc., 447 B.R. 243, 248 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). The reasoning is that because a Ponzi scheme relies on constant infusions of new cash in order to satisfy existing obligations, a Ponzi scheme can never be solvent.
Notably, the presumption may also be applied to other fraudulent schemes similar to Ponzi schemes (“Ponzi-like schemes”). See, e.g., In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 2012 WL 4755028, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (“[Debtor’s] leasing and financing transactions were a “Ponzi-like” scheme and, as such, establish [debtor’s] actual fraudulent intent.”).
Parties who wish to benefit from the Ponzi scheme presumption may follow the lead of the plan proponents in iCap Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 23-01243 (Bankr. E.D. Wash). In iCap, the plan proponents sought a finding from the bankruptcy court that the debtor operated a Ponzi scheme, and the court recently entered a confirmation order that contains this finding. The plan proponents sought this finding in part to benefit from the Ponzi scheme presumption when seeking to unwind prepetition transactions.
The plan proponents also sought this finding for other reasons. For example, this finding would help resolve disputes over intercompany and intercreditor claims, liens and causes of action. Furthermore, the plan proponents noted that the Ponzi scheme finding would allow victims to take advantage of special rules enacted by the Internal Revenue Service. These rules allow victims of Ponzi schemes to deduct losses for income tax purposes as theft losses instead of capital losses, thereby avoiding the cap on capital loss deductions.
As noted above, given the benefits of the Ponzi scheme presumption, and its many practical applications, creditors in bankruptcy cases involving fraud may seek similar findings as iCap Enterprises. This finding may be particularly helpful if the fraud is merely a Ponzi-like scheme, where application of the Ponzi scheme presumption may be more difficult to prove.
When an involuntary bankruptcy petition is dismissed, section 303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to seek reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs from the petitioners, and, if the petition was filed in bad faith, damages proximately caused by the bad-faith filing and punitive damages. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). What if the petitioner is a state—say, a state taxing authority, which may seek an involuntary petition to recover allegedly unpaid taxes? Under Supreme Court precedent, states have sovereign immunity shielding them from most lawsuits without their consent. But Congress also has the constitutional power to set bankruptcy law, and the Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity does not shield states from at least some claims grounded in laws enacted pursuant to that power. Central Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). The application of these principles to claims under section 303(i) is discussed in a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Montana Dep’t of Revenue v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20462, 112 F.4th 837 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024).
We have blogged previously about the involuntary petition filed against Timothy Blixseth. The Montana Department of Revenue (“MDOR”) and three other creditors filed an involuntary petition that Blixseth sought to dismiss on the ground that the creditors’ claims were subject to bona fide disputes. In a 2019 decision, the Ninth Circuit agreed. The case returned to the bankruptcy court, which dismissed the petition. Blixseth then brought an adversary proceeding against MDOR under section 303(i) seeking attorneys’ fees and costs, proximate and punitive damages, and sanctions against counsel. MDOR sought dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity. The bankruptcy court rejected the sovereign immunity defense, on the grounds that (1) MDOR had voluntarily invoked the court’s jurisdiction with the involuntary petition, (2) MDOR’s counsel had waived sovereign immunity based on an earlier colloquy with the court while the involuntary petition was pending, and (3) a 303(i) action is ancillary to the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction and therefore is not subject to sovereign immunity. MDOR appealed to the Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that the bankruptcy court’s decision was not a final order. MDOR appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. As an initial matter, it noted that denials of sovereign immunity are immediately appealable, contrary to the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. The court then proceeded to address the bankruptcy court’s three grounds for rejecting MDOR’s sovereign immunity defense. On the first ground, the bankruptcy court had relied on the principle that when a state files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case, it waives sovereign immunity as to any claim by the bankruptcy estate that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the state’s claim. The Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning. The Ninth Circuit explained that a section 303(i) claim does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence underlying the involuntary petition, because it arises from the fact of the petition itself. The Ninth Circuit also rejected an analogy to Rule 11 sanctions, noting that it had previously distinguished between Rule 11, a sanctions statute pertaining to specific filings, and section 303(i), a fee-shifting statute pertaining to the merits of the litigation as a whole. On the second ground, that MDOR’s counsel had waived sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit noted that a waiver of sovereign immunity had to be “unequivocal” and concluded that MDOR’s counsel could not and did not effect an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.
The Ninth Circuit’s most extended analysis concerned Katz. The Ninth Circuit explained that Katz held that the bankruptcy clause in the Constitution manifested state consent to subordinate sovereign immunity to the in rem jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court and orders ancillary to that jurisdiction. In Katz, the Supreme Court held that this consent extended to the avoidance of preferential transfers, since avoidance and recovery of preferential transfers was a core longstanding aspect of the administration of bankrupt estates. The Ninth Circuit analyzed whether Blixseth’s 303(i) claim fell under Katz by looking to three core functions of bankruptcy proceedings referenced in Katz: “[1] the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property, [2] the equitable distribution of that property among the debtor’s creditors, and [3] the ultimate discharge that gives the debtor a ‘fresh start’ by releasing him, or her, or it from further liability for old debts.” Blixseth, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20462, at *16 (quoting Katz, 546 U.S at 363‑64). The Ninth Circuit held that none of these functions were implicated by the 303(i) action. Section 303(i) is a remedial scheme for dismissed involuntary petitions and has no relation to exercising jurisdiction over a debtor’s property or equitably distributing that property among creditors. Nor is it related to affording debtors a fresh start—Blixseth, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, did not seek a fresh start with respect to old debts but rather reimbursement of his costs for the involuntary petition.
As such, the Ninth Circuit concluded that sovereign immunity applied, and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court with instructions to dismiss the 303(i) claim as barred by sovereign immunity.
The attorneys in Patterson Belknap‘s Business Reorganization and Creditors' Rights practice group offer our clients a broad array of experience and skills managing, mitigating, and monetizing every kind of financial distress. Our clients include indenture trustees, banks, creditors’ committees, examiners, developers, manufacturers, licensors, and other businesses, partnerships, individuals, and foreign and domestic government agencies. We assist them in bankruptcy matters, bankruptcy-related litigation, out-of-court workouts, and many other special situations.
Bankruptcy Proceedings
Patterson Belknap plays a variety of roles in hundreds of bankruptcy cases nationwide. We represent secured and unsecured creditors, landlords and tenants, creditors’ committees and court-appointed trustees in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, liquidations under Chapter 7, cross-border proceedings under Chapter 15, and municipal bankruptcy cases under Chapter 9. A few examples of the Firm’s diverse work include:
Financial Distress Outside of Bankruptcy: Workouts, Acquisitions and Troubled Loans
Patterson Belknap regularly represents parties engaging in transactions (particularly financings, purchases and sales, and franchising) with distressed companies outside of and prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy case. The firm offers advice on structuring transactions to avoid or minimize risks resulting from the subsequent insolvency or bankruptcy of the distressed party. Patterson Belknap also represents secured lenders and borrowers in connection with the restructuring of lending arrangements involving financially illiquid or distressed companies. Some examples include:
Multidisciplinary Approach
Financial distress, insolvency and bankruptcy can occur in every sector, in different economic climates, and anywhere in the world. So our diverse nationwide and international practice spans a broad range of industries in foreign and domestic jurisdictions around the world. The attorneys in Patterson Belknap‘s Business Reorganization and Creditors' Rights practice group are able to provide efficient service without sacrificing the resources of a larger firm: we regularly partner with colleagues who focus on litigation, internal investigations, real estate, and tax, to provide our clients with the full panoply of services required to mitigate and manage the risks associated with financial distress.
Litigation
Patterson Belknap is particularly known for its active and effective litigation in bankruptcy court. It represents several major corporations in preference and related bankruptcy litigation on a coast-to-coast basis, but concentrates in handling complex litigation arising from bankruptcy cases. Noteworthy matters include:
Investigations
Patterson Belknap, well known for its investigative work, serves a substantial number of financial institutions and major corporations with sensitive internal and external matters requiring independent scrutiny. This work extends into the bankruptcy and debtor-creditor area. The firm’s attorneys have frequently been called upon to perform investigations and to act swiftly to maximize recovery on behalf of creditors, creditors’ committees or trustees in bankruptcies and workout cases involving allegations of fraud and embezzlement. Representative matters include:
Real Estate
Patterson Belknap’s debtor-creditor practice often comes together with the firm’s Real Estate practice to assist landlords, lenders, developers and others in efforts to restructure troubled real estate projects. The firm also handles foreclosure and related bankruptcy litigation. Some noteworthy matters include:
Pro Bono
Finally, like all of Patterson Belknap’s lawyers, the attorneys in the Business Reorganization and Creditors' Rights practice group take seriously their commitment to providing pro bono legal services. By partnering with legal service organizations throughout New York, the firm regularly serves low-income and indigent clients who might not otherwise have access to high quality legal representation. Recent matters include: