First Circuit Clarifies the Scope of the Bankruptcy Court’s Jurisdiction in Civil Proceedings

Case Summaries

No Easy Way Out: Legal Malpractice Defendants Desiring an Alternative Forum May Be Forced to Litigate in Bankruptcy Court until the Case is “Trial Ready”

August 25, 2017

Some legal malpractice defendants are content to litigate claims asserted by debtors in the bankruptcy court. But many others, fearing that the debtor’s creditors may view them as a deep-pocketed resource to augment their own recoveries, would prefer to defend malpractice claims in what they view as a more neutral forum. A recent decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida underscores how difficult it can be for lawyers and law firms in this latter group to move a legal malpractice case out of bankruptcy court, even when it is clear that the bankruptcy court cannot finally adjudicate the dispute.

In Menotte v. Englett and Associates, PLLC, the Court refused to withdraw the reference – even though the claims against the defendant were not core and the defendant was entitled to a jury trial – because “other factors” justified delaying withdrawal of the reference “until the case is ready for trial.”[1] This decision follows a robust line of cases, one that is hardly limited to malpractice actions, and presents a quandary for those malpractice defendants for whom the bankruptcy court is not the preferred forum. If the District Court refuses to withdraw the reference until the case is trial ready, these defendants may have no choice but to remain in bankruptcy court for months if not years of discovery and other pre-trial proceedings.

Background

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all proceedings arising in, arising under or related to a case under the Bankruptcy Code, but may refer them to the bankruptcy court.[2] Each judicial district in the nation has done just that: all bankruptcy matters filed in any federal district are automatically referred to the bankruptcy court in that district. But, where an Article III court is required, “[t]he district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred [to the bankruptcy court], on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown.”[3]

The statute does not define the term “cause,” but most courts look to the same factors to determine whether to withdraw the reference: whether the proceeding is core or non-core[4]; whether there is a right to a jury trial[5]; and whether any “other factors” weigh in favor of withdrawal.[6]

The first two prongs of this analysis are rarely problematic for malpractice defendants. Claims by a debtor for legal malpractice are paradigmatically non-core: they involve rights created by state law that are independent of and antecedent to the bankruptcy petition and do not depend on the bankruptcy laws for their existence.[7] Likewise, malpractice claims are legal claims that entitle the defendant to a trial by jury.[8]

In fact, some courts have concluded that withdrawal of the reference may be appropriate simply upon a showing that the matter is not core and the moving party has a right to a jury trial.[9] However, one final prong of the analysis – whether “other factors,” support withdrawal – is often used to delay withdrawal of the reference even where it cannot be denied altogether.

“Other Factors” Can Delay Withdrawal of the Reference for Years

The “other factors” that courts consider – including judicial efficiency, uniformity of bankruptcy administration, delay and cost to the parties, and prevention of forum shopping – are frequently cited to deny or delay withdrawal of the reference of non-core claims for which the defendant has a right to a jury trial.[10] From the perspective of a malpractice defendant seeking a different venue than the bankruptcy court, these concepts are so malleable that their application can lead to unpredictable and inconsistent results.[11] Courts that favor immediate withdrawal tend to reason that it promotes judicial economy and avoids duplication given that dispositive motions will be subject to de novo review by the district court and the proceeding will eventually be transferred to the district court for a jury trial. Courts that decline to withdraw immediately also claim the mantle of efficiency, reasoning that the bankruptcy court is better-positioned to supervise discovery and other pretrial matters.[12]

In Menotte, for example, citing the Bankruptcy Court’s familiarity with the adversary proceeding, the Court held that “withdrawal of the reference is presently premature, and will be appropriate only if and when this adversary proceeding becomes ready for a jury trial.”[13] The “trial-ready” requirement is not found anywhere in the statute, but it is routinely cited by district courts – the same district courts that would otherwise inherit the matter in question – to defer withdrawal of the reference, sometimes for years of discovery and other pre-trial matters.[14]

Defendants of pre-petition malpractice claims brought by a debtor – indeed any party seeking a a forum other than the bankruptcy court – may find that even the right to a jury trial on a non-core claim that the bankruptcy court cannot finally adjudicate is not sufficient to merit immediate withdrawal of the reference. Instead, the district court has the discretion to maintain the reference of these claims to the bankruptcy court until they are ready for trial, even if that is years away.

[1] Menotte v. Englett and Associates, PLLC, et al. (In re: Olander), Case No. 17-80077 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2017) [D.I. 5] (“Menotte”)

[2] 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).

[3] 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (emphasis added). (This is generally known as “permissive” withdrawal. The statute also provides for mandatory withdrawal of the reference upon a determination that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both the Bankruptcy Code and other federal laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce. This analysis in this article focuses on permissive withdrawal).

[4] Claims in bankruptcy are divided into two categories: “core” and “non-core.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). A bankruptcy court may “hear and determine” and “may enter appropriate orders and judgments” with respect to core proceedings. Id. But, absent consent of the parties, a bankruptcy court may not enter final orders with respect to non-core proceedings and instead must “submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court” for de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (c)(1). So, a finding that a matter is non-core favors withdrawal of the reference because the district court’s involvement is preordained.

[5] A Bankruptcy Court is not permitted to conduct a jury trial without the consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e). For this reason, the right to a jury trial favors withdrawal of the reference.

[6] See, e.g., In re Orion, 4 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[O]nce a district court makes the core/non-core determination, it should weigh questions of efficient use of judicial resources, delay and costs to the parties, uniformity of bankruptcy administration, the prevention of forum shopping, and other related factors.).

[7] Courts are almost uniform in holding that such claims are not core. In re Queyrouze, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122802 (E.D. La. Sept. 15, 2015) (allegations of negligence and legal malpractice are non-core); Distefano v. Law Offices of Barbara H. Katsos, P.C., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63155 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“well-settled” that pre-petition legal malpractice claims are non-core); Joseph DelGreco & Co. v. DLA Piper LLP (US), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10972 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2011)( “It is clear that a claim alleging pre-petition malpractice is a non-core claim”).

To be clear, this does not extend to claims for legal malpractice in connection with the bankruptcy case itself. Allegations that a lawyer or law firm committed malpractice while representing a debtor, and after its retention has been authorized by the Bankruptcy Court under the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, are analyzed differently. There is a strong argument that such claims are core. See, e.g., In re KSL Media, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1917 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“claims based solely on acts committed by bankruptcy fiduciaries that occurred either in the administration of the estate or in preparation for that administration” are core).

[8] See, e.g., DelGreco at *12 (“[A] claim for malpractice is legal . . . and the Seventh Amendment therefore preserves the right to jury trial in such cases”).

[9] See DelGreco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10972, at *11–12 (“a finding that a claim is non-core and that a jury demand has been filed may create cause for withdrawing the reference”); Orion, 4 F.3d at 1101 (“If a case is non-core and a jury demand has been filed, a district court might find that the inability of the bankruptcy court to hold the trial constitutes cause to withdraw the reference.”).

[10] JLL Consultants, Inc. v. Goldman Kurland & Mohidin, LLP, 565 B.R. 556, 566 (D. Del. 2016)(“Permitting the Bankruptcy Court to oversee pretrial matters in this proceeding, and withdrawing it only when it is ripe for a jury trial, promotes judicial economy and a timely resolution of this case.”); Youngman v. Hoffman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94593 (D.N.J. 2009)(“[T]his Court finds that the better course, for uniformity and efficiency in bankruptcy administration and to expedite the bankruptcy process, is to not interfere with the Bankruptcy Court's ongoing management of the case, leaving it with the Bankruptcy Court until all pre-trial matters are resolved-- i.e. until such time as a jury trial becomes necessary.”).

[11] Compare Wellman Thermal Sys. Corp. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45725, 11-12 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (“Certain efficiencies would be lost were the bankruptcy court to proceed with pretrial matters; the district court would not gain a valuable familiarity with the case that could assist it leading up to and through trial”) with Heller Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP, 464 B.R. 348, 357 (N.D. Cal. 2011)(“[T]he bankruptcy judge is particularly familiar with the facts and legal issues that underlie the claims . . [and thus] is better equipped to handle any pre-trial proceedings.”).

[12] See DeGiacomo v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61998 (D. Mass. 2014) (collecting cases).

[13] Menotte at 3.

[14] See Buchwald v. Renco Group, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9389 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004) (collecting cases and noting that, “often, courts in this District have found it appropriate to defer withdrawing the reference until the case is trial ready.”)

Case Summaries

August 18, 2017

Daniel A. Lowenthal

Recently, in Gupta v. Quincy Medical Center, 858 F.3d 657 (1st Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit clarified the limits of the bankruptcy courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction over civil proceedings. The decision, authored by Judge Lipez and joined by retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter (sitting by designation), provides a thorough analysis of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction in such cases.

The decision hinges on the Court’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1334, the foundation of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction. Under § 1334(a), the bankruptcy courts (via referral from the district courts) have original jurisdiction over petitions for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Under § 1334(b), the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over other civil proceedings “arising under,” “arising in,” or “related to” cases filed under the Code. In Gupta, the First Circuit wrestled with the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction under § 1334(b).

Gupta involves claims for severance payments by former senior executives of the debtor, a hospital in the Boston suburbs. Shortly after filing its chapter 11 petition, the debtor sold its assets in a 363 sale. The asset purchase agreement (APA) obligated the purchaser to make severance payments to employees who were terminated after the sale.

The order approving the 363 sale provided that the bankruptcy court would retain jurisdiction over any disputes arising under or related to the sale contract. The debtor’s plan and the confirmation order also each provided that the bankruptcy court would retain exclusive jurisdiction to enforce orders providing for the sale of the debtor’s property.

Immediately after the sale closed, the purchaser terminated the executives. The executives sought an order from the bankruptcy court requiring payment of severance, as provided in the APA. The bankruptcy court held it had jurisdiction over the executives’ claims, emphasizing the retention of jurisdiction provisions in the sale order, plan, and confirmation order. After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an order finding the purchaser liable to the executives for the severance pay.

The Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdictional analysis was wrong. The First Circuit agreed that the bankruptcy courts (like all federal courts) retain jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of their prior orders, but stressed that “a bankruptcy court may not ‘retain’ jurisdiction it never had—i.e., over matters that do not fall within § 1334’s statutory grant.” Thus, if the bankruptcy court never had jurisdiction over the executives’ claims in the first place, the fact that the sale order, plan, and confirmation order purported to “retain” that jurisdiction was irrelevant.

In conducting its analysis, the bankruptcy court had never analyzed whether it purported to have “arising under,” “arising in,” or “related to” jurisdiction under § 1334(b). On appeal, the First Circuit undertook that analysis.

The First Circuit quickly rejected “arising under” jurisdiction (which exists where the Bankruptcy Code itself creates the cause of action) because Massachusetts contract law—not the Code—created the executives’ claims for severance pay.

Likewise, the Court rejected “related to” jurisdiction, which concerns claims that potentially may have an effect on the bankruptcy estate. The executives’ claims for severance pay against the purchaser, the Court of Appeals reasoned, could not conceivably impact the debtor’s estate.

The only remaining possibility was “arising in” jurisdiction. But the Court found that lacking, as well. The Court rejected the executives’ argument that the bankruptcy court had “arising in” jurisdiction because, but-for the existence of the debtor’s bankruptcy, their severance pay claims would not exist. It is not enough, the Court held, that a claim arose in the context of a bankruptcy case; in doing so, the Court specifically rejected the executives’ reliance on a “but for” test. Rather, the Court held, “for ‘arising in’ jurisdiction to apply, the relevant proceeding must have no existence outside of the bankruptcy context.” In other words, “the fundamental question is whether the proceeding by its nature, not its particular factual circumstance, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case.” (emphasis in original) This standard, the Court concluded, was not met: the executives’ claims as “essentially employment disputes” based on state contract law, and thus “look like [claims] that could have arisen entirely outside the bankruptcy context.”

It is no doubt tempting for practitioners and bankruptcy courts to include retention of jurisdiction clauses into orders resolving disputes in bankruptcy litigation. Gupta, however, suggests that such clauses might not be reflexively followed and that the jurisdictional foundation of the bankruptcy courts’ rulings in civil proceedings may be subjected to scrutiny.

Industry Updates

Non-Monetary Preferences

August 11, 2017

David W. Dykhouse

Most everyone who has been around the business and legal worlds for even a little while is familiar with the clawback by bankruptcy trustees of money that was paid by the debtor to creditors on the eve of bankruptcy. We bankruptcy lawyers know this as the avoidance of preferential payments under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. Good credit and collection folks at our clients have developed an aversion to the word “preference” because they think the Code was deliberately designed to punish the diligent and reward the lazy (and, in a sense, they’re right).

Far less familiar, even to many lawyers, is the risk of avoidance of a preferential transfer of property other than money. Section 547(b) of the Code targets “any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property” that is made “for or on account of an antecedent debt” and satisfies the other criteria of subsection (b) and is not protected by one of the defenses provided in subsection (c). “Property” is far broader than money and can include virtually anything.

So when is property other than money transferred “for or on account of an antecedent debt” that could be at risk of avoidance in the event of a bankruptcy? Here are two examples:

(1) B Company and S Company enter into an asset acquisition agreement pursuant to which, at closing, B Co. will purchase an asset from S Co. At the time of the signing of the agreement, B Co. makes a down payment of 50% of the agreed price and is obligated to pay the balance at the closing. The down payment creates a debt of S Co. that is intended to be satisfied at the closing by the transfer of the asset to B Co. When the closing occurs at some time thereafter and the asset is conveyed to B Co., a transfer on account of an antecedent debt has occurred (to the extent of the down payment) that is at risk of avoidance in a subsequent bankruptcy of S Co.

(2) S Corp., a widget wholesaler, sells a large quantity of widgets to B Corp., a retailer, on 30-day credit. On the payment date, B Corp. is unable to pay, so B Corp. and S Corp. agree that B Corp. will return the widgets to S Corp. for a credit against the unpaid price. The return of goods for credit against the account payable for those goods is a transfer of property on account of an antecedent debt that is at risk of avoidance in a subsequent bankruptcy of S Corp.[1]

An example of the first kind of transaction is found in Thompson v. McMaster (In re Fritz-Mair Manufacturing Co.), 16 B.R. 417 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982), in which the defendant prepaid the debtor for an oil-field pump jack, the subsequent delivery of which the bankruptcy trustee attacked as a voidable preference. The defendant escaped with its pump jack, but only after proving at trial that it was protected by one of the defenses provided in Section 547(c). In Danning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of North America), 836 F.2d 1214 (9^th Cir.), cert. den. 486 U.S. 1056 (1988), the defendant was not so fortunate. The defendant thought that he had purchased gold bullion from the debtor in exchange for a simultaneous payment of the cash purchase price long before bankruptcy. However, due to the debtor’s fraud, the bullion was not acquired and delivered to the defendant until shortly before the commencement of the debtor’s bankruptcy case, and the defendant’s payment for the bullion had in fact been a prepayment. The delivery of the bullion to the defendant was a transfer on account of an antecedent debt that had arisen at the time of the defendant’s prepayment to the debtor to which none of the defenses provided in subsection (c) applied, and the defendant was out of luck.

A return-of-goods preference is illustrated in Active Wear, Inc. v. Parkdale Mills, Inc., 331 B.R. 669 (W.D. Va. 2005), in which the debtor returned a large quantity of yarn it couldn’t pay for to the defendant, its supplier, shortly before bankruptcy. The defendant’s liability was open-and-shut, and the only thing worth fighting over with the trustee was the amount of damages.[2]

The risk of avoidance of the conveyance of assets at the closing of a purchase (and related risks arising from transacting with a financially troubled counterparty) can be greatly reduced by careful transaction planning and document drafting, and the risk of avoidance of a return of goods can be controlled by measures taken at the time of the initial extension of credit and delivery of the goods or, much less effectively and certainly, at the time of the return of the goods. Inattention to these risks until the trustee serves his summons and complaint is likely to result in litigation risk and expense that could have been prevented or substantially diminished.

[1] Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a safe harbor of limited value for goods that are recovered pursuant to a reclamation notice that meets the conditions of that subsection and non-bankruptcy commercial law. Other longstanding bankruptcy principles exempt a return of goods that are the seller’s collateral securing a fully secured debt.

[2] The same outcome generally prevailed under the old Bankruptcy Act that was replaced in 1978. Marks v. Goodyear Rubber Sundries, Inc. (In re M&R Plastic Co.), 238 F.2d 533 (2d. Cir. 1956)

The attorneys in Patterson Belknap‘s Business Reorganization and Creditors' Rights practice group offer our clients a broad array of experience and skills managing, mitigating, and monetizing every kind of financial distress. Our clients include indenture trustees, banks, creditors’ committees, examiners, developers, manufacturers, licensors, and other businesses, partnerships, individuals, and foreign and domestic government agencies. We assist them in bankruptcy matters, bankruptcy-related litigation, out-of-court workouts, and many other special situations.

Bankruptcy Proceedings

Patterson Belknap plays a variety of roles in hundreds of bankruptcy cases nationwide. We represent secured and unsecured creditors, landlords and tenants, creditors’ committees and court-appointed trustees in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, liquidations under Chapter 7, cross-border proceedings under Chapter 15, and municipal bankruptcy cases under Chapter 9. A few examples of the Firm’s diverse work include:

Patterson Belknap represented the indenture trustee for more than five billion dollars of unsecured debt issued by an energy portfolio company in the largest bankruptcy case ever filed in Delaware.
The firm was lead counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of multi-state real estate developer with liabilities in excess of a billion dollars. The Bankruptcy Court praised the “remarkable results” achieved through the “extraordinary efforts” of Patterson Belknap attorneys in this case.
Patterson Belknap regularly represents one of the nation’s largest pharmaceutical, consumer health, and medical device manufacturers as a significant creditor in bankruptcy cases nationwide.
The firm served as New York counsel for the largest private bank in Brazil in connection with the Chapter 15 bankruptcy case of a Brazilian company.
Patterson Belknap represented the winning bidder in an auction to acquire the assets and intellectual property from a Chapter 7 debtor over the objection and competing bid of the debtor’s secured lender.
The firm represented the Indenture Trustee for a series of unsecured notes in connection with an Italian insolvency proceeding and a related chapter 15 case.

Financial Distress Outside of Bankruptcy: Workouts, Acquisitions and Troubled Loans

Patterson Belknap regularly represents parties engaging in transactions (particularly financings, purchases and sales, and franchising) with distressed companies outside of and prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy case. The firm offers advice on structuring transactions to avoid or minimize risks resulting from the subsequent insolvency or bankruptcy of the distressed party. Patterson Belknap also represents secured lenders and borrowers in connection with the restructuring of lending arrangements involving financially illiquid or distressed companies. Some examples include:

Advising and representing a secured lender in the restructuring of its credit facilities with a series of related agribusinesses in Colorado, including the sale of real property and the liquidation of other collateral.
Advising foreign banks in the modification of revolving credit facilities to a troubled commodities dealer in order to avoid bankruptcy proceedings.
Advising several of the nation’s largest pharmaceutical manufacturers on structuring joint ventures with distressed or non-creditworthy companies.
Acquisition by a real estate and retailing organization of a major independent oil refiner in Chapter 11 through stock purchase from secured creditors.
Acquisition by an investment company of a controlling interest in a defense aviation company and related businesses outside of Chapter 11.
Providing advice on closing out commodities transactions with a major financially troubled trading company.
Providing guidance to foreign exporters and their banks and credit insurers concerning transactions with distressed U.S. Companies.

Multidisciplinary Approach

Financial distress, insolvency and bankruptcy can occur in every sector, in different economic climates, and anywhere in the world. So our diverse nationwide and international practice spans a broad range of industries in foreign and domestic jurisdictions around the world. The attorneys in Patterson Belknap‘s Business Reorganization and Creditors' Rights practice group are able to provide efficient service without sacrificing the resources of a larger firm: we regularly partner with colleagues who focus on litigation, internal investigations, real estate, and tax, to provide our clients with the full panoply of services required to mitigate and manage the risks associated with financial distress.

Litigation

Patterson Belknap is particularly known for its active and effective litigation in bankruptcy court. It represents several major corporations in preference and related bankruptcy litigation on a coast-to-coast basis, but concentrates in handling complex litigation arising from bankruptcy cases. Noteworthy matters include:

Representation of a major financial institution in a negligence suit against a nationwide accounting firm upon which it relied in lending to a bankrupt manufacturer.
Representation of a nationwide accounting firm in litigation brought by financial institutions which relied on it in lending to a bankrupt commodities trader.
Working in tandem with the firm’s nationally-renowned Law Firm Defense group, Patterson Belknap has developed significant experience defending lawyers and law firms against malpractice and malfeasance claims in Bankruptcy Court.

Investigations

Patterson Belknap, well known for its investigative work, serves a substantial number of financial institutions and major corporations with sensitive internal and external matters requiring independent scrutiny. This work extends into the bankruptcy and debtor-creditor area. The firm’s attorneys have frequently been called upon to perform investigations and to act swiftly to maximize recovery on behalf of creditors, creditors’ committees or trustees in bankruptcies and workout cases involving allegations of fraud and embezzlement. Representative matters include:

Investigation of issues critical to chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of major cryptocurrency exchange and its affiliates, including potential conflicts of interest and fraudulent transfers, that were summarized in two publicly filed reports; served as counsel to the court-appointed Examiner.
Investigation of multi-million dollar embezzlement and misappropriation by financial officer of an entertainment company and diversified efforts to recover embezzled and misappropriated assets in a Chapter 11 case; related civil litigation resulting in significant recovery from a third party whose negligence contributed to loss.
Investigation of embezzlement by senior financial officer of a manufacturing company resulting in restitution agreement involving other creditor interests.
Advising securities firm which suffered heavy losses as a result of unauthorized investments by senior executives.
Internal investigation for a national law firm following its role in a large Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.

Real Estate

Patterson Belknap’s debtor-creditor practice often comes together with the firm’s Real Estate practice to assist landlords, lenders, developers and others in efforts to restructure troubled real estate projects. The firm also handles foreclosure and related bankruptcy litigation. Some noteworthy matters include:

Representation of landlords in connection with tenant bankruptcies, assumption and assignment of leases, and sales to new owners.
Representation of a large North American banking corporation in prosecution of secured and unsecured claims against a major New York real estate partnership and related individuals, in both state and federal courts.
Representation of numerous single-asset borrowers with significant commercial real estate in New York, including the Architects’ & Designers’ Building, the Designers’ & Decorators’ Building, 275 Madison Avenue, 633 Third Avenue and 909 Third Avenue, as well as 114 Sansome Street in San Francisco.

Pro Bono

Finally, like all of Patterson Belknap’s lawyers, the attorneys in the Business Reorganization and Creditors' Rights practice group take seriously their commitment to providing pro bono legal services. By partnering with legal service organizations throughout New York, the firm regularly serves low-income and indigent clients who might not otherwise have access to high quality legal representation. Recent matters include:

Assist with the wind-down and liquidation of a not-for-profit advocacy and lobbying organization, ensuring that the officers and directors who served in a voluntary capacity were not held personally liable for the organization’s debts.
Secured dismissal of a bankruptcy case that was filed to frustrate and delay the claims of nail salon workers who allege they were paid below minimum wage in violation of New York and federal wage and hour laws.
Obtained favorable settlement for underpaid restaurant workers after commencing an adversary proceeding to establish that their claims could not be discharged in bankruptcy.

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