Independent Examiner in FTX Bankruptcy Case
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A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals highlights an existing circuit split regarding appellate standing.[1]
Courts in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have disagreed whether objection and attendance at a hearing are prerequisites for satisfying the “person aggrieved” requirement for appellate standing. Compare In re Schultz Mfg. Fabricating Co., 956 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1992) (attendance and objection at a bankruptcy court proceeding are requirements for appellate standing) with In re Urban Broad. Corp., 401 F.3d 236, 244 (4th Cir. 2005) (attendance and objection are not necessary for standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order).
In a case of first impression in the Ninth Circuit,[2] the panel reversed a district court’s determination that the members of a limited liability company lacked standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order approving the trustee’s assumption of the company’s operating agreement because, despite receiving adequate notice, they did not file an objection or attend the hearing on the motion.[3]
Siding with the Fourth Circuit the Court reasoned that, “bankruptcy standing concerns whether an individual or entity is ‘aggrieved,’ not whether one makes that known to the bankruptcy court.” So, it concluded that “an appellant’s failure to attend and object at a bankruptcy court hearing has no bearing on the question of whether that appellant has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order.”[4] Rather, the controlling inquiry is “whether the appellant was directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the bankruptcy court's order.”[5]
This case may offer some reprieve to non-objecting parties that wish to challenge a bankruptcy court’s order post-entry – at least in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits – but prudence always dictates the filing of an objection and attendance at a hearing. Even in courts where failure to object does not present a standing issue, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that such failure could nevertheless “result in waiver or forfeiture of the right to make certain arguments or object to certain claims.”[6]
But more than a cautionary tale about waiver and forfeiture, this decision has practical application, too. Many bankruptcy-related transactions (e.g., the effectiveness of a plan of reorganization, the closing of a sale of assets, etc.) are tied to entry of a final order, i.e., one that is no longer subject to appeal. When an order of the bankruptcy court is unopposed, practitioners in jurisdictions that require an objection and attendance at a hearing to establish appellate standing might be more comfortable declaring an order to be “final” before the end of the 14-day appeal period set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a)(1).[7] But, in jurisdictions that permit an aggrieved party to take an appeal from an order that it never objected to, the finality of unopposed bankruptcy court orders may depend on expiration of the time to appeal.
[1] Harkey v. Grobstein (In re Point Ctr. Fin., Inc.), No. 16-56321, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 14046 (9th Cir. May 29, 2018).
[2] Apparently contrary authority from a 1985 Ninth Circuit decision was dismissed as mere dicta. See id. at 9 (“This court's suggestion in In re Commercial Western Finance Corp., 761 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1985), that ‘attendance and objection should usually be prerequisites to fulfilling the “person aggrieved” standard’ was not a holding and does not bind us.”).
[3] See id. at 11.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 11-12 (quoting Urban Broad. Corp., 401 F.3d at 244).
[6] Id. at 12. “The terms waiver and forfeiture—though often used interchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not synonymous. Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right; waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Id. at 12-13 ((quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. Of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017)). Based on this distinction, and because the appellants filed a motion to reconsider after the bankruptcy court’s oral ruling on the motion but before it issued a written order, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the appellants had not waived their appeal rights in this case. Whether the appellants forfeited their appeal rights will be considered on remand. Id.
[7] See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1).
On June 4, the Supreme Court decided Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, No. 16-1215, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sotomayor. The Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit and resolved a circuit split about the meaning of “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” in section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 523(a)(2) bars the discharge in bankruptcy of certain debts obtained through fraud. Section 523(a)(2)(A) bars the discharge of debts “obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,” except when such debts were obtained by “a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.” Section 523(a)(2)(B) addresses debts obtained by “a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition,” barring their discharge only when the statement in question was “written,” “materially false,” reasonably relied upon by the creditor, and published by the debtor with intent to deceive.
Together, section 523(a)(2)(A) and section 523(a)(2)(B) establish a scheme where the debtor’s ability to discharge a debt obtained through a misrepresentation can depend on whether the misrepresentation was “a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.” In particular, if the debtor made an oral misrepresentation to obtain the debt, the debt can be discharged if it was a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition, because section 523(a)(2)(B) requires a writing to block discharge. But if it was not such a statement, the debt cannot be discharged, because section 523(a)(2)(A) does not require that the misrepresentation be in writing.
This Supreme Court case involves such a situation. Respondent R. Scott Appling represented to petitioner Lamar, Archer & Cofrin LLP that he was expecting a tax refund of $100,000. In fact, he only received a refund of $59,851. He subsequently told Lamar that he had not yet received the refund. Relying on these representations, Lamar continued to represent him and delayed collection of outstanding fees. Appling later filed for bankruptcy, and Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking to block discharge of the debt Appling owed it on the ground that it was nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy court found that Appling had knowingly made misrepresentations about the tax refund. It further held that, because the statements were only about a single asset, they were not statements “respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition,” and the debt could not be discharged. The district court affirmed, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that, because a single asset has an impact on a debtor’s overall financial condition, a statement about a single asset is a statement “respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.”
The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit. Focusing on the word “respecting,” it read the term to mean “related to,” rejecting Appling’s argument that it has a narrower meaning. It thus understood “respecting” to have an expansive effect, including in the statutory phrase any statement that “has a direct relation to or impact on the debtor’s overall financial status.” Lamar, slip op. at 9. Since a statement about a single asset clearly has an impact on the debtor’s overall financial status, it counts as a “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.” Such a statement, then, cannot be a basis for barring discharge of a debt unless it is in writing.
The Court went on to conclude that Lamar’s interpretation was inconsistent with the history and structure of the provision. It noted that on Lamar’s interpretation, a misrepresentation about a single asset included on a balance sheet would trigger the additional requirements of section 523(a)(2)(B), while the same misrepresentation made by itself would not, which it characterized as a “seemingly arbitrary” distinction. Id. at 10. It also pointed to court interpretations of a similar phrase in a previous version of the Bankruptcy Code, a “statement in writing respecting . . . financial condition,” which courts consistently interpreted to include statements concerning just one or some of a debtor’s assets or liabilities. The Court invoked the presumption that Congress is aware of judicial interpretations of past legislative language when Congress adopts legislation using such language anew. Id. at 10-11.
The Court additionally rejected Lamar’s purposive arguments. Lamar argued that reading section 523(a)(2)(B) to encompass statements about single assets would leave little work to be done by section 523(a)(2)(A), but the Court noted that 523(a)(2)(A) still covers frauds that do not involve statements, such as fraudulent transfers, and frauds that involve misrepresentations about the value of goods and services. Id. at 12. Lamar further argued that a broad interpretation undermined the Bankruptcy Code’s purpose to only protect honest debtors. The Court, relying on legislative history, noted that Congress had intentionally sought to protect certain debtors who made misrepresentations in the course of obtaining a debt, because of worries about unscrupulous lenders who would manipulate borrowers into making misrepresentations so as to prevent the debt from being discharged in bankruptcy. It further observed that creditors worried about being defrauded could simply require that borrowers make representations in writing, which has other benefits as well. Id. at 13-15. (Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito did not join this part of the opinion, perhaps because it relied on legislative history.)
Judge Martin Glenn granted recognition to a UK scheme of arrangement with third-party releases that lacked full creditor consent. In re Avanti Communs. Grp., PLC, No. 18-10458, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1078 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2018). While stating that “granting third-party releases in chapter 11 cases is controversial,” Judge Glenn noted that courts will more willingly enforce third-party releases in chapter 15 cases, given the importance of comity and respect for foreign proceedings.
Avanti operated fixed satellite services on three continents. Based in London, the debtor ran into financial difficulties after the launch of two satellites was delayed. To deleverage its balance sheet, the debtor and noteholders agreed to equitize certain debt via a court proceeding in London.
A scheme of arrangement was sanctioned by the High Court of Justice of England and Wales. UK law permits schemes of arrangements to include third-party releases. The scheme in Avanti granted releases to non-debtor affiliate-guarantors. Over 98 percent (but not 100 percent) of the class of creditors approved the scheme. No creditor voted against it.
The scheme appointed a foreign representative to bring a chapter 15 case in the U.S. The debtor didn’t have a place of business in the U.S., but could maintain chapter 15 jurisdiction. In the Second Circuit, this means that Bankruptcy Code section 109(a) must be satisfied. A debtor needs “a domicile, a place of business or property in the United States.” Avanti had a retainer payment on deposit in its U.S. lawyers’ account at a bank in New York, and the Indenture at issue was governed by New York law.
Judge Glenn said that “[s]chemes of arrangement under UK law have routinely been recognized as foreign proceedings in chapter 15 cases.”[1] And the evidence showed that the UK was the debtor’s center of main interests: it was incorporated in the UK and had its registered offices and headquarters there. Accordingly, Judge Glenn concluded that the UK case was a “foreign main proceeding” under chapter 15.
The crucial question was whether the Court should respect the third-party releases sanctioned in the scheme when less than 100 percent of the creditor class voted to support them. Judge Glenn noted different approaches U.S. Courts of Appeals have taken in chapter 11 cases. Some courts prohibit such releases absent creditor consent, while other courts permit them in “limited circumstances.”[2] But Judge Glenn also observed that “[i]n the chapter 15 context, judges in this Court have often enforced third-party releases in foreign proceedings under section 1507 of the Bankruptcy Code.”[3]
Bankruptcy Code section 1521 permits courts to grant “any appropriate relief” as long as the interests of creditors and other parties are respected.[4] Courts can provide “additional assistance, consistent with principles of comity.”[5] Judge Glenn observed that the types of protections listed in section 1507 had previously been part of Bankruptcy Code section 304. But in section 1507(b), “the principle of comity was removed as one of the factors and elevated to the introductory paragraph. The legislative history confirms that the principle of comity was placed in the introductory language to section 1507 to emphasize its importance” in chapter 15 cases.[6]
The “exercise of comity” includes “recognizing and enforcing a foreign plan confirmation order.”[7] Both comity and chapter 15’s emphasis on “cooperation with foreign courts” led Judge Glenn to conclude that the UK scheme of arrangement with third-party non-debtor guarantor releases “should be recognized and enforced under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.”[8]
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