Independent Examiner in FTX Bankruptcy Case
Firm Serves as Counsel to the Examiner
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of almost all proceedings to recover property from the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). A party in interest can seek an order exempting it from the automatic stay for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). A creditor that fails to obtain relief from the stay is limited to the claim-adjudication process in bankruptcy court. What happens if the bankruptcy court rules against a creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay, and the creditor seeks to appeal? Can the creditor appeal immediately or must it wait until its claim is fully adjudicated in bankruptcy court? The question turns on the interpretation of the federal statute governing bankruptcy appeals, which provides that appeals may be taken from “final judgments, orders and decrees . . . entered in cases and proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (emphasis added). An automatic stay does not finally resolve a bankruptcy “case,” but does it finally resolve a bankruptcy “proceeding”? On January 14, the Supreme Court resolved that question affirmatively in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, ruling that a creditor who is denied relief from the automatic stay may appeal immediately.
Ritzen Group, Inc. (“Ritzen”) brought a breach of contract suit in Tennessee state court against Jackson Masonry, LLC (“Jackson”). Shortly before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, and the state-court proceeding was stayed under the automatic stay. Ritzen sought an order from the bankruptcy court permitting the trial to go forward in state court, arguing that Jackson had filed for bankruptcy in bad faith. The bankruptcy court denied the motion and Ritzen did not appeal. Ritzen filed a proof of claim against the bankruptcy estate, which Jackson contested, and after an adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court ruled against Ritzen on the merits. After the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan, Ritzen filed appeals from the order denying relief from the automatic stay and from the order ruling against it on the merits of its breach-of-contract claim. As to Ritzen’s appeal from the automatic-stay order, the district court ruled that it was untimely, because the order had been immediately appealable and the time for filing an appeal was 14 days from when the order was entered. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Ritzen sought and obtained Supreme Court review.
The Supreme Court began by noting the difference between appealability in bankruptcy and appealability in general federal civil litigation. In general federal civil litigation, a party may normally appeal only from an order that resolves an entire case. A bankruptcy case, however, can involve many individual controversies, which absent bankruptcy might be resolved in separate lawsuits. The statute governing bankruptcy appeals thus permits appeals from final orders entered in bankruptcy “proceedings” as well as bankruptcy “cases,” which permits an appeal from a bankruptcy order that finally resolves a discrete dispute within a bankruptcy case. The Court thus asked whether an order denying relief from the automatic stay is such an order.
The Supreme Court concluded that it was. The Court reasoned that stay-relief adjudication is a distinct procedural unit, involving notice and a hearing and a determination of a creditor’s eligibility for relief based on a federal statutory standard. Claims adjudication is a separate process typically governed by state substantive law. While stating it was not determinative, the Court also noted that a neighboring statutory provision lists motions for stay relief as a separate bankruptcy “core proceeding” from the allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
Ritzen argued that an order denying stay relief was not a final order resolving a proceeding because it simply determined the forum in which a creditor could bring its claim against the estate. The Court gave several reasons for rejecting this argument. The Court noted that a decision on the automatic stay can have substantive consequences beyond the forum, such as delaying collection of a debt or causing collateral to decline in value. Further, orders denying access to a forum sometimes qualify as final appealable orders, such as an order dismissing an action for want of personal jurisdiction or improper venue. Also, because the automatic stay operates as a bar on even nonjudicial efforts to collect or control the debtor’s assets, motions for stay relief may not involve claims that would be brought in another judicial proceeding but for bankruptcy.
The Court also rejected Ritzen’s argument that orders denying relief from the automatic stay being appealable will disrupt the bankruptcy process. Instead, the Court explained, holding otherwise would cause delays and inefficiencies. Absent immediate appealability, a creditor that lost on the stay-relief issue would have to litigate its claim in bankruptcy court and then, if it successfully appealed the stay-relief order, re-do the litigation in its original forum.
At the end of the decision, the Court added a footnote noting that it was not deciding whether an order denying stay relief would be “final” (and therefore appealable) if the order did not preclude later applications for the same relief because further developments might change the stay calculus. (This issue was raised when the case was argued in November.)
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to stay in control of their businesses in chapter 11. But the Code also empowers bankruptcy judges to replace a debtor’s management in certain circumstances with an outside trustee. This will happen if either cause exists to expel management or appointing a trustee is in the best interests of creditors, any equity holders, and other interests of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1007. Judges don’t need to hold an evidentiary hearing to appoint a trustee, but the decision to do so must be based on clear and convincing evidence.
An example of how courts can rely on evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing arose in a recent case in New Jersey. MicroBilt Corp. v. Ranger Specialty Income Fund (In re Princeton Alt. Income Fund), No. 3:18-cv-16557, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205745 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2019).
Princeton Alternative Income Fund, LP is a Delaware limited partnership that makes loans to consumer finance companies. Princeton Alternative Funding, LLC is its general partner. In March 2018, both entities filed for chapter 11. An unsecured creditor filed a motion to appoint a chapter 11 trustee. After the motion was granted, a trustee was appointed to replace management.
Another creditor appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the decision. The appellant also asserted that the bankruptcy court erred by granting the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The district judge affirmed the bankruptcy court, ruling that judges need not hold an evidentiary hearing in order to appoint a chapter 11 trustee. Even so, the decision to replace management with a trustee must be based on sufficient evidence.
That the statute requires having sufficient evidence, but does not require an evidentiary hearing, is widely accepted in the case law. The cases found and cited by the district court in the Princeton decision reached this conclusion. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, * 6-7. A bankruptcy court can appoint a trustee after “notice and a hearing.” 11 U.S.C. § 1104. And that means, “after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances.” 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(A). But an actual evidentiary hearing isn’t required by the statute.
A court considering a request to appoint a trustee must consider the “totality of the circumstances.’’ 2019 U.S Dist. LEXIS 205745, *6. Courts have “wide discretion” but, as noted above, the evidence favoring the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee must be “clear and convincing.” “[A] bankruptcy court must simply find in its discretion that appointment for a trustee is warranted.” Id., *10.
In Princeton, the bankruptcy court cited the “history of the proceedings” and the “conduct of the parties.” The court had seen “acrimony” between the parties – “deep-seated conflict and animosity,” “serious conflicts,” potential “gridlock,” “friction” and “legalistic bickering.” Id. More specifically, the debtors and creditors had shown “extreme animosity toward one another as evidenced by, among other things, their frequent discovery disputes, the ongoing litigation [in] many jurisdictions[,] and numerous accusations of wrongdoing both pre-and post-petition.” Id.
The district court concluded that the “Bankruptcy Court properly took judicial notice of each of the items of evidence on which it relied to find that the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee would be in the creditors’ best interest.” Id., *11. In light of the factors cited, it was unnecessary for the bankruptcy court to hold an evidentiary hearing. “The Bankruptcy Court possessed the quantum of evidence necessary to support its findings under § 1104(a)(2).”
Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to initiate an involuntary bankruptcy case against a debtor. The petition initiating the case must be filed by creditors holding claims aggregating to at least $10,000,[1] and those claims must not be “contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.” 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). Courts have disagreed as to how this provision applies when a portion of a claim is undisputed. Some courts have held that, when the undisputed portion of a claim is sufficient for the aggregated claims to reach $10,000, a dispute about the remainder of the claim does not disqualify the claim as a whole. Other courts have held that any bona fide dispute about the amount of a claim is a “bona fide dispute as to liability or amount” that prevents a claim from being used to support an involuntary bankruptcy petition. On November 26, inMontana Department of Revenue v. Blixseth, 942 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit embraced the second position, ruling against a state tax agency that had a large tax claim against the debtor, most of which was subject to bona fide dispute but $200,000 of which was not.
In April 2011, the Montana Department of Revenue (“MDOR”) and two other creditors, later joined by a fourth creditor, initiated an involuntary bankruptcy case against Timothy L. Blixseth, a co-founder of the private ski resort Yellowstone Mountain Club. MDOR’s claim was based on an audit that found a deficiency of $56.8 million. Prior to the petition, Blixseth had contested all of the audit findings except one disallowed deduction, which MDOR calculated as giving rise to $216,657 owed.
Blixseth moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the underlying claims were ineligible under section 303 because they were subject to bona fide disputes. The bankruptcy court converted the motion to one for summary judgment and held that the claims of MDOR and two other creditors were subject to bona fide dispute, and thus granted summary judgment in favor of Blixseth. (When a debtor has twelve or more creditors, as the bankruptcy court found Blixseth did here, an involuntary bankruptcy petition can only be brought by three or more creditors.) The district court affirmed. MDOR appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by discussing the history of the bona fide dispute provision in section 303(b)(1). The court explained that the requirement that the claims not be subject to a bona fide dispute was enacted in 1984 to address the risk of creditors using bankruptcy to coerce debtors to pay disputed claims. The 1984 version, however, did not define the meaning of “bona fide dispute” and courts disagreed about whether a dispute as to the amount of the claim, as opposed to one about liability, qualified as a “bona fide dispute” under the statute. The Ninth Circuit, interpreting the 1984 language, held in 2004 that only a dispute as to amount that brought the aggregate value of the claims below the statutory threshold qualified as such a dispute. Focus Media, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co. (In re Focus Media, Inc.), 378 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). Section 303 was then amended in 2005 to state that the claims must not be “the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.”
The Ninth Circuit noted that courts have been evenly split on the effect of the 2005 amendment. Some courts have held, consistent with a literal reading of the text of the statute, that any dispute as to amount makes a claim ineligible under section 303(b)(1). Other courts have held that Congress was simply ratifying the approach of cases like Focus Mediadecided prior to the amendment, and a dispute about the amount of a claim that does not bring the aggregate amount below the statutory threshold of $10,000 does not affect the claim’s eligibility under section 303(b)(1).
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the first approach. The court emphasized that this reading was most consistent with the plain language of the statute. The text does not qualify “amount” and does not cabin its scope to disputes about amount that bring the claims below the statutory threshold. While the court acknowledged that prior bankruptcy practice is informative, it held that such practice did not justify departing from the plain text here. The court explained that prior to the 2005 amendment, there was no uniform approach to section 303(b)(1). While the amendment clarified that a dispute about amount qualifies as a “bona fide dispute,” it did not clearly adopt the Focus Mediaapproach.
The Ninth Circuit noted that its approach agreed with the two other circuit court decisions interpreting section 303(b)(1) from the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. See Fustolo v. 50 Thomas Patton Drive, LLC, 816 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2016); Credit Union Liquidity Servs., LLC v. Green Hills Dev. Co. (In re Green Hills Dev. Co.), 741 F.3d 651, 660 (5th Cir. 2014). It rejected MDOR’s argument that its reading leads to an absurd result. Instead, the court said, the facts here actually illustrate how the plain-meaning reading better accords with the policy purpose of preventing creditors from using bankruptcy to coerce debtors into paying disputed claims. MDOR sought to leverage the undisputed $200,000 portion of its claim to collect on a disputed claim that was several times larger, which is precisely what the bona fide dispute provision is meant to prohibit.
The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the rulings of the bankruptcy court and the district court that MDOR lacked standing as a petitioning creditor.
[1] This statutory threshold is periodically adjusted for inflation by regulation. At the time of the petition, the threshold was $14,425.


Partner
Mr. Lowenthal, Chair of the firm’s Business Reorganization and Creditors' Rights Practice, has earned recognition as a skilled advocate in the bankruptcy, creditors' rights, and corporate restructuring arena. He represents creditors' committees, trade creditors, indenture trustees, and bankruptcy trustees and examiners in domestic and international cases.
Mr. Lowenthal recently served as counsel to the court-appointed Examiner in the chapter 11 cases of FTX Trading Ltd. and its affiliates. In this position, he investigated issues critical to the FTX bankruptcy cases, including potential conflicts of interest and fraudulent transfers, that were summarized in two publicly filed reports.
Mr. Lowenthal also represents U.S. and non-U.S. business entities in a wide range of complex litigation issues, including creditors’ rights disputes, purchases of intellectual property assets, and distressed debt acquisitions and restructuring. He has achieved numerous favorable results for clients in trial and appellate courts as well as commercial arbitration. Recently, he successfully defended former executives of a failed European bank against allegations that they had defrauded investors.
A regular speaker on bankruptcy law topics, Mr. Lowenthal recently presented for the American Bankruptcy Institute, the Practising Law Institute, INSOL International, INSOL Europe, and the Association of Corporate Counsel. Most recently, Mr. Lowenthal was a member of INSOL Europe’s 2023 Amsterdam Congress Technical Committee. He has been recognized by JD Supra’s Readers’ Choice Awards as one of the top ten authors in the Bankruptcy category from 2023-2026. Mr. Lowenthal has received Martindale-Hubbell’s highest rating of "AV Preeminent" based on both peer and client reviews and has been named to The Best Lawyers in America in the area of Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights / Insolvency and Reorganization Law. He has also been named by Super Lawyers in the areas of bankruptcy: business and business litigation. Lastly, Mr. Lowenthal has been named to the 2022-2026 editions of the Lawdragon 500 Leading U.S. Bankruptcy & Restructuring Lawyers guide.
Representative Matters
Represented court-appointed Examiner in chapter 11 cases of FTX Trading Ltd., including assisting him with various investigations summarized in two publicly filed reports.
Represented foreign administrators of a global alternative energy company in its chapter 15 cross-border bankruptcy case, successfully petitioning the court for the return of over $28 million held in a U.S. bank account.
Representing noteholders of a Brazilian company in a lawsuit arising from a debt default.
Representing the Oversight Committee for a post-confirmation liquidating trust in the Southern District of Texas.
Representing the Indenture Trustee for a series of unsecured notes in connection with an Italian insolvency proceeding and a related chapter 15 case.
Represented a bidder in a competitive auction to acquire the assets of a chapter 11 debtor.
Lead counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of multi-state real estate developer with liabilities in excess of a billion dollars. The Bankruptcy Court praised the “remarkable results” achieved through the “extraordinary efforts” of Patterson Belknap attorneys in this case.
Representing an international financial institution as Indenture Trustee in cross-border insolvency cases pending in Grand Cayman and Hong Kong.
Represented an Indenture Trustee and Co-Chair of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors on over $5 billion of unsecured debt in one of the largest, most complex cases ever filed in Delaware, the Energy Future Holdings Corp. cases.
Represented an Indenture Trustee in the Nortel Networks Inc. cross-border cases, a set of insolvency cases filed in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.
Represented an Indenture Trustee on bonds governed by New York law in an insolvency case in London.
Represented an Indenture Trustee on $1.7 billion of unsecured debt in the Washington Mutual, Inc. case.
Representing a former member of the Board of Directors in The Weinstein Company Holdings bankruptcy case.
Represented an international law firm in a proceeding before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court relating to conflicts of interest in a Chapter 11 representation.
Represented the winning bidder in an auction to acquire the assets and intellectual property from a Chapter 7 debtor over the objection and competing bid of the debtor’s secured lender.
Special litigation counsel to an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to investigate fraudulent conveyance claims.
Conducted an internal investigation of a multi-national law firm following its role in a large Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
Representing the Post-Confirmation Trustee in the Tarragon Corporation case.
Special litigation counsel to a Chapter 7 trustee in the bankruptcy of an employee leasing company.
Represented an Indenture Trustee in the Nortel Networks Inc. cross-border cases, a set of insolvency cases filed in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.
Represented the Liquidating Trust Board in the TerreStar Networks Inc. case.
Represented the Trust Oversight Committee in the Disney retail store chain case.
Represented Harrison J. Goldin, an Examiner in the Enron Corp. case, in an investigation of many of Enron's special-purpose-entity transactions.
Representing international creditors, including entities in the U.K., the Netherlands, and Germany, in the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. case.
Represented a Scottish aviation company in the Hawker Beechraft Corporation case.
Defending a reinsurance company in a fraudulent conveyance lawsuit brought by creditors of Tribune Company in U.S. Federal Court.
Representing a Mexican creditor in the Stanford International Bank Ltd. case.
Obtained a favorable result on behalf of the largest private bank in Brazil in connection with the Chapter 15 case of a Brazilian company.
Represented the Retiree Committee in the U.S. Airways, Inc. case, including serving as trial counsel on the debtor’s motion to eliminate retiree benefits.
Won a crucial decision of first impression for financial institutions whose security interests were challenged by the bankruptcy trustee in The Bennett Funding Group, Inc. case, a case that stemmed from an alleged $1 billion Ponzi scheme.
Represented the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the STAR Telecommunications, Inc. case.
MEMBERSHIPS: American Bar Association; Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization Committee of the New York City Bar Association; American Bankruptcy Institute; Board of Editors, The Bankruptcy Strategist; INSOL International; INSOL Europe (2023 Amsterdam Congress Technical Committee); Turnaround Management Association and the New York Institute of Credit.
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