Independent Examiner in FTX Bankruptcy Case
Firm Serves as Counsel to the Examiner
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of a creditors’ committee in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102. There is no parallel provision applicable to chapter 7 cases. When a bankruptcy case is converted from chapter 11 to chapter 7 while the creditors’ committee is pursuing an appeal, what happens to that appeal? In In re Constellation Enterprises LLC, Civ. No. 17-757-RGA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47153 (D. Del. Mar. 22, 2018), the United States District Court for the District of Delaware held that such an appeal should be dismissed because the appellant, the creditors’ committee, had been dissolved by the conversion.
In May 2016, the debtors filed for relief under chapter 11. In September 2016, the debtors and the creditors’ committee moved for approval of a settlement. After the Supreme Court ruling in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the bankruptcy court denied approval of the settlement, rejecting the arguments of the creditors’ committee that the settlement proposal did not fall within the holding of Jevic. On May 30, 2017, the committee appealed the settlement denial. Shortly thereafter, on June 23, 2017, the debtors, who had not appealed the settlement denial, moved to convert their chapter 11 cases to chapter 7 cases. Over the objections of the creditors’ committee, the bankruptcy court granted the conversion effective October 2, 2017. The creditors’ committee appealed this order as well.
The United States Trustee and other interested parties moved to dismiss both appeals, arguing that, upon conversion of the underlying cases to chapter 7, the creditors’ committee was dissolved and no longer had the capacity to appeal. The Trustee pointed to case law about corporations providing that the dissolution of a corporation terminates all litigation involving that corporation. The creditors’ committee responded by arguing that the underlying conversion order was improper, that even if it were proper the Bankruptcy Code does not require dissolution of the committee upon conversion, and that a bylaw amendment it enacted transferring its rights to an ad hoc committee of its former members sufficed to preserve the appeal even if the committee was dissolved.
The district court agreed with the Trustee. First, the court held that the committee was dissolved when the cases were converted to chapter 7. It pointed to section 103(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that the sections providing authority for the creation and powers of a creditors’ committee are applicable only in chapter 11 cases. It also noted numerous statements in other cases that suggest that dissolution occurs upon conversion. The creditors’ committee cited a First Circuit case, In re SPM Manufacturing Corp., 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993), where the court resolved an appeal by a chapter 11 creditors’ committee post-conversion, but the district court noted that no party had raised the issue and rejected the idea that the First Circuit had resolved the issue implicitly. The district court distinguished a second case cited by the creditors’ committee, In re Lyons Transportation Lines, Inc., 162 B.R. 460 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994), where the bankruptcy court had permitted a creditors’ committee to survive post-conversion to provide its views to the trustee. In that case, the district court noted, the bankruptcy court had wanted the special expertise of the creditors’ committee because of the complexity of the issues, a consideration not present here.
Second, the district court rejected the committee’s argument that due process required permitting the committee to appeal a conversion order that the creditors’ committee saw as procedurally improper. It noted that any creditor could have appealed the settlement denial or the conversion order, but none had chosen to do so. It likewise rejected the committee’s argument that conversion should not be approved where it would interfere with a pending appeal, noting that such a rule would open up “another avenue for potential gamesmanship and abuse in the proceedings.” In re Constellation Enterprises LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47153 at *21.
Third, the district court rejected the committee’s position that a valid transfer of rights had occurred by means of a committee bylaw purporting to reconstitute itself as an ad hoc committee in the event a court ruled it dissolved. The district court ruled that no provision in the Bankruptcy Code permitted the transfer of the committee’s rights or duties to another entity, and that such a transfer is impossible because the interests of the committee, as an entity created by statute to represent the interests of a class of creditors, are distinct from the interests of the committee members in their personal capacities.
Having rejected the committees’ arguments, the district court dismissed the appeals.
This post reviews some concepts concerning executory contracts. The ground covered will be familiar to insolvency experts and should be insightful for readers who don’t specialize in U.S. bankruptcy law.
The springboard for the overview is an opinion issued last week, In re Cho, Case No. 17-22057, 2018 LEXIS 700 (MMH) (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 13, 2018). Before the chapter 11 case was filed, Chong Ok Lim and Young Jun (“Plaintiffs”) owned a dry cleaning business that was later owned and operated by Byung Mook Cho (“Cho”). The parties had a dispute that led to lawsuit and a judgment for the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs later alleged that Cho and He Sook Paik (“Paik“) “conspired to fraudulently convey” the dry cleaning business to Cho.
In 2017, the parties reached an oral agreement to end the dispute. But when the agreement was put in writing (the “Settlement Agreement”), Cho would not sign it. Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the agreement. The state court judge ruled for the Plaintiffs, but Cho still would not sign, and Plaintiffs moved to hold him in civil contempt. Before that motion was heard, Cho and the dry cleaning business, The New Belvedere Cleaners, Inc. (together, the “Debtors”), filed for chapter 11 and then a motion to reject the Settlement Agreement.
Bankruptcy Judge Michelle H. Harner first ruled that the Settlement Agreement (which, as noted above, Cho never signed) “represents the agreement reached by the parties and should be recognized as a valid and enforceable contract.”[i] The next issue was whether the Settlement Agreement was an executory contract. The classic definition of an executory contract (and also an unexpired lease) is one where, when a bankruptcy case is filed, both parties still have unperformed obligations such that the failure of one to perform would constitute a breach of the agreement. The unperformed obligations must be material and not trivial.[ii]
The parties agreed that the Debtors still had material, unperformed obligations under the terms of the Settlement Agreement: they had to transfer the dry cleaning business and make a cash payment. But the Plaintiffs argued that their unperformed obligations were not material. They had to dismiss the state court action and claims against Paik in the bankruptcy court, and file a notice of satisfaction of claims against Paik in state court. These obligations, Judge Harner ruled, were also material because they “speak directly to the primary purpose of settling the litigation and providing finality and certainty for the parties.”[iii]
She also concluded that another term both sides agreed to — not to disparage the other — was material. She noted that some courts “have found negative covenants insufficient to render a contract executory for purposes of the [Bankruptcy] Code.”[iv] But in view of the facts of this case, Judge Harner concluded that the non-disparagement clause was material.
When a contract is executory, a debtor in a bankruptcy case can either assume or reject it. Typically, a court will respect a debtor’s business judgment. A contract can be assumed if a debtor cures defaults and gives adequate assurance of future performance.[v]
Courts will permit rejection when a debtor can show a contract is burdensome to a bankruptcy estate. Here, the Debtors said the Settlement Agreement was burdensome because it required the Debtors to transfer the business to the Plaintiffs and make a cash payment. And, Judge Harner noted, the Debtors had not acted in bad faith in seeking to reject the Settlement Agreement. Instead, they were trying to “get out from under a deal [they] now do not like.”[vi] Therefore, she granted the motion to reject.
Rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach of the agreement just before the petition date and permits the non-breaching party to file an unsecured claim for damages. But, while the Plaintiffs could file a claim for damages, Judge Harner made clear that the law would not allow them to seek specific performance. In other words, the Plaintiffs couldn’t force the Debtors to transfer the dry cleaning business.
The benefit of this case is that it does more than address the concepts of executory contracts and assumption and rejection. It shows the power of rejection when applied to a straightforward commercial dispute over ownership of a business. Several years before the motion was granted, the Plaintiffs thought they had an agreement to settle a lawsuit with the business to transfer to them. But that didn’t happen. Motion practice in state court and a resulting bankruptcy case led to the motion to reject. And when the Court upheld the Debtors’ business judgement, the Plaintiffs were left with an unsecured claim for damages, but were unable to press for what they had negotiated for in the prior settlement discussions: possession of the business.
[i] 2018 LEXIS 700 at *15.
[ii] This definition is referred to as the Countryman definition because it was articulated by Professor Vern Countryman. Another test is referred to as the functional test: it considers if assumption or rejection (concepts discussed below) provide a benefit to a bankruptcy estate.
[iii] 2018 LEXIS 700 at *20-21.
[iv] Id. at *25.
[v] Debtors can also assume and assign executory contracts, and the assignee must provide adequate assurance of future performance.
[vi] 2018 LEXIS 700 at *29.
In U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, No. 15-1509, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1520 (Mar. 5, 2018), the Supreme Court analyzed the appropriate standard of review for appellate courts reviewing a bankruptcy court’s determination of a “mixed question” of law and fact. But the Court did not address whether the lower courts’ various “non-statutory insider” tests should be refined—although the concurrences strongly suggest that issue may be ripe for increased scrutiny.
The debtor in this case, Village at Lakeridge, LLC (“Lakeridge”), was a Reno, Nevada company wholly owned by MBP Equity Partners (“MBP”). Lakeridge had two main creditors: MBP and U.S. Bank (which Lakeridge owed $10 million on a loan). Both creditors were impaired under Lakeridge’s proposed plan. After failing to achieve consensual confirmation, Lakeridge looked to the Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provision, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). To confirm a cramdown plan, Lakeridge needed consent from one class of impaired creditors that was not an insider. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). That posed a problem: U.S. Bank refused to consent and MBP—as Lakeridge’s parent company—was an insider and thus could not provide the necessary consent.
As a workaround, Lakeridge arranged to transfer MBP’s claim to another party. Kathleen Bartlett (who both served on MBP’s board and was an officer of Lakeridge) arranged for her boyfriend, Robert Rabkin (“Rabkin”), to purchase MBP’s multimillion dollar claim for $5,000. Rabkin then consented to Lakeridge’s cramdown plan.
U.S. Bank objected that Rabkin should be regarded as an insider for plan confirmation purposes. U.S. Bank argued that, even though Rabkin was not formally affiliated with MBP or Lakeview, his relationship with Bartlett meant that he should be regarded as a “non-statutory insider” who could not consent to a cramdown plan.
At an evidentiary hearing, both Rabkin and Bartlett conceded that they were involved in a romantic relationship. Yet the bankruptcy court held Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider because, it concluded, Rabkin did not co-habit or mingle finances with Bartlett and had purchased the MBP claim as a speculative investment. Under the applicable Ninth Circuit test, a creditor cannot be a non-statutory insider if the relevant transaction was negotiated at arm’s length. The bankruptcy court held that the claim purchase was an arms’ length transaction, and thus Rabkin was not an insider.
The subsequent appeals focused on how the appellate courts should review the bankruptcy court’s determination on that point. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court, applying clear-error review and finding the bankruptcy court’s conclusions could not be invalidated under that deferential standard.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the issue of the standard of review. In a unanimous decision by Justice Kagan, the Court held that the standard of review for a bankruptcy court’s determination whether a creditor is a non-statutory insider must proceed in three separate steps:
“In short,” Lakeridge holds, “the standard of review for a mixed question all depends—on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.” Id. In this instance, the bankruptcy court considered whether the facts about Rabkin’s relationship and subjective intent in purchasing the MBP claim showed that the transaction at issue was conducted at arms’ length. That determination, the Supreme Court concluded, was “about as factual sounding as any mixed question gets”—and, accordingly, the Ninth Circuit was correct to apply clear-error review to it.
This short and crisp decision will provide a helpful analytical pathway for lower courts wrestling with the standard of review in bankruptcy appeals. But Lakeridge is also noteworthy for what it did not decide. As the decision repeatedly explained, the Court did not opine on whether the Ninth Circuit’s test for assessing non-statutory insiders was correct. See 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1520, at *10; see also id. at *8 n.1. Yet both concurrences, by Justices Sotomayor and Kennedy, suggest that it is far from clear that the Ninth Circuit’s test is right. See 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1520, at *22 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing “concerns with the Ninth Circuit’s test” and inviting the lower courts to engage in “additional consideration” of the correct standard for evaluating non-statutory insiders); id. at *18 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (encouraging courts of appeals to “elaborate in more detail” the legal test for assessing non-statutory insiders).
As Justice Sotomayor stressed, the Ninth Circuit’s test defeats a finding of non-statutory insider status if the bankruptcy court concludes the transaction was conducted at arms’ length, regardless of whether or not the creditor is closely connected with the debtor. That formulation, she argued, is problematic, since the plain meaning of the term “insider” in the Bankruptcy Code “generally rests on the presumption that a person or entity alleged to be an insider is so connected with the debtor that any business conducted between them necessarily cannot be conducted at arm’s length.” Id. at *23.
Lakeridge provides a straightforward answer on the standard-of-review issue, but generates other questions on the appropriate test for identifying non-statutory insiders. The latter is sure to spark discussion among the lower courts in future cases.


Partner
Mr. Lowenthal, Chair of the firm’s Business Reorganization and Creditors' Rights Practice, has earned recognition as a skilled advocate in the bankruptcy, creditors' rights, and corporate restructuring arena. He represents creditors' committees, trade creditors, indenture trustees, and bankruptcy trustees and examiners in domestic and international cases.
Mr. Lowenthal recently served as counsel to the court-appointed Examiner in the chapter 11 cases of FTX Trading Ltd. and its affiliates. In this position, he investigated issues critical to the FTX bankruptcy cases, including potential conflicts of interest and fraudulent transfers, that were summarized in two publicly filed reports.
Mr. Lowenthal also represents U.S. and non-U.S. business entities in a wide range of complex litigation issues, including creditors’ rights disputes, purchases of intellectual property assets, and distressed debt acquisitions and restructuring. He has achieved numerous favorable results for clients in trial and appellate courts as well as commercial arbitration. Recently, he successfully defended former executives of a failed European bank against allegations that they had defrauded investors.
A regular speaker on bankruptcy law topics, Mr. Lowenthal recently presented for the American Bankruptcy Institute, the Practising Law Institute, INSOL International, INSOL Europe, and the Association of Corporate Counsel. Most recently, Mr. Lowenthal was a member of INSOL Europe’s 2023 Amsterdam Congress Technical Committee. He has been recognized by JD Supra’s Readers’ Choice Awards as one of the top ten authors in the Bankruptcy category from 2023-2026. Mr. Lowenthal has received Martindale-Hubbell’s highest rating of "AV Preeminent" based on both peer and client reviews and has been named to The Best Lawyers in America in the area of Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights / Insolvency and Reorganization Law. He has also been named by Super Lawyers in the areas of bankruptcy: business and business litigation. Lastly, Mr. Lowenthal has been named to the 2022-2026 editions of the Lawdragon 500 Leading U.S. Bankruptcy & Restructuring Lawyers guide.
Representative Matters
Represented court-appointed Examiner in chapter 11 cases of FTX Trading Ltd., including assisting him with various investigations summarized in two publicly filed reports.
Represented foreign administrators of a global alternative energy company in its chapter 15 cross-border bankruptcy case, successfully petitioning the court for the return of over $28 million held in a U.S. bank account.
Representing noteholders of a Brazilian company in a lawsuit arising from a debt default.
Representing the Oversight Committee for a post-confirmation liquidating trust in the Southern District of Texas.
Representing the Indenture Trustee for a series of unsecured notes in connection with an Italian insolvency proceeding and a related chapter 15 case.
Represented a bidder in a competitive auction to acquire the assets of a chapter 11 debtor.
Lead counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of multi-state real estate developer with liabilities in excess of a billion dollars. The Bankruptcy Court praised the “remarkable results” achieved through the “extraordinary efforts” of Patterson Belknap attorneys in this case.
Representing an international financial institution as Indenture Trustee in cross-border insolvency cases pending in Grand Cayman and Hong Kong.
Represented an Indenture Trustee and Co-Chair of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors on over $5 billion of unsecured debt in one of the largest, most complex cases ever filed in Delaware, the Energy Future Holdings Corp. cases.
Represented an Indenture Trustee in the Nortel Networks Inc. cross-border cases, a set of insolvency cases filed in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.
Represented an Indenture Trustee on bonds governed by New York law in an insolvency case in London.
Represented an Indenture Trustee on $1.7 billion of unsecured debt in the Washington Mutual, Inc. case.
Representing a former member of the Board of Directors in The Weinstein Company Holdings bankruptcy case.
Represented an international law firm in a proceeding before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court relating to conflicts of interest in a Chapter 11 representation.
Represented the winning bidder in an auction to acquire the assets and intellectual property from a Chapter 7 debtor over the objection and competing bid of the debtor’s secured lender.
Special litigation counsel to an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to investigate fraudulent conveyance claims.
Conducted an internal investigation of a multi-national law firm following its role in a large Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
Representing the Post-Confirmation Trustee in the Tarragon Corporation case.
Special litigation counsel to a Chapter 7 trustee in the bankruptcy of an employee leasing company.
Represented an Indenture Trustee in the Nortel Networks Inc. cross-border cases, a set of insolvency cases filed in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.
Represented the Liquidating Trust Board in the TerreStar Networks Inc. case.
Represented the Trust Oversight Committee in the Disney retail store chain case.
Represented Harrison J. Goldin, an Examiner in the Enron Corp. case, in an investigation of many of Enron's special-purpose-entity transactions.
Representing international creditors, including entities in the U.K., the Netherlands, and Germany, in the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. case.
Represented a Scottish aviation company in the Hawker Beechraft Corporation case.
Defending a reinsurance company in a fraudulent conveyance lawsuit brought by creditors of Tribune Company in U.S. Federal Court.
Representing a Mexican creditor in the Stanford International Bank Ltd. case.
Obtained a favorable result on behalf of the largest private bank in Brazil in connection with the Chapter 15 case of a Brazilian company.
Represented the Retiree Committee in the U.S. Airways, Inc. case, including serving as trial counsel on the debtor’s motion to eliminate retiree benefits.
Won a crucial decision of first impression for financial institutions whose security interests were challenged by the bankruptcy trustee in The Bennett Funding Group, Inc. case, a case that stemmed from an alleged $1 billion Ponzi scheme.
Represented the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the STAR Telecommunications, Inc. case.
MEMBERSHIPS: American Bar Association; Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization Committee of the New York City Bar Association; American Bankruptcy Institute; Board of Editors, The Bankruptcy Strategist; INSOL International; INSOL Europe (2023 Amsterdam Congress Technical Committee); Turnaround Management Association and the New York Institute of Credit.
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