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On September 9, 2024, the Hon. William Orrick of the District of Northern California imposed the maximum penalty sought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) against Defendant Matthew Panuwat—a civil fine of three times Panuwat’s profits and a permanent bar from serving as an officer or director of a public company—in a decision that denied requests to overturn the jury’s verdict or grant a new trial.[1]
As we discussed in Shadow Trading Court to Weigh Competing Post-Trial Motions, the SEC premised its request for the maximum penalty on a number of factors, including its characterization of Panuwat’s conduct as “egregious,” noting that Panuwat was a sophisticated trader and former investment banker who admitted to knowing that trading securities based on his company’s material non-public information (“MNPI”) was prohibited.[2]
This was the SEC’s first enforcement action brought on the theory of “shadow trading,” a type of illegal insider trading in which MNPI from one company is leveraged to execute a transaction in the securities of a second company whose share price is predictably correlated to the disclosure of the MNPI.[3]
“Novelty” Was Irrelevant
Panuwat sought to overturn the jury’s verdict based in part on novelty, contending that it was “grossly unfair” for the SEC to “argue the case under a garden variety theory of insider trading” especially in light of the Court’s “ruling that no one at trial could characterize the case as ‘highly unusual,’ ‘unique,’ ‘novel,’ ‘unanticipated,’ ‘unexpected,’ or brought without fair notice.”[4]
The Court rejected this argument,[5] siding instead with the view of SEC’s Director of Enforcement, Gurbir Grewal:
As we’ve said all along, there was nothing novel about this matter, and the jury agreed: this was insider trading, pure and simple. Defendant used highly confidential information about an impending announcement of the acquisition of biopharmaceutical company Medivation, Inc., the company where he worked, by Pfizer Inc. to trade ahead of the news for his own enrichment.[6]
“Express” Policy Term Not Required
Panuwat also argued that the SEC should be required to demonstrate that Medivation “expressly forbade him from trading Incyte securities.”[7] Panuwat based this argument on the principle that full disclosure may foreclose liability because there can be no concealment by the trader entrusted with the MNPI.[8]
Rejecting this view, the Court stated that “to find a defendant liable under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, the SEC must demonstrate that the defendant ‘knowingly misappropriated [MNPI] for securities trading purposes, in a breach of duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence owed to the source of the information.’”[9] “The SEC’s theory at trial was that Medivation entrusted Panuwat with confidential information and he exploited it for his own gain.”[10]
The Court concluded that requiring the SEC to demonstrate that Panuwat knew his Incyte “trades were prohibited by Medivation [ ] would largely defeat the purpose of the duty of trust and confidence that the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have described.”[11]
Timing and Silence May Show Intent
Regarding scienter, Panuwat claimed that the evidence offered by the SEC was legally insufficient for the jury to conclude that he intended to defraud Medivation. Panuwat argued that the SEC’s evidence was limited to: (1) he possessed “confidential information”; (2) the timing of his trade “suggested he recognized the information he possessed was material to Incyte”; and (3) that he allegedly “knew he lacked consent” because he “never told anyone about his trades.”[12]
The Court also rejected this argument, finding instead that these facts alone were “sufficient for a jury to conclude that Panuwat acted knowingly or recklessly in using Medivation’s confidential information that was material to Incyte to trade in— and profit greatly from trades in—Incyte call options.”[13]
The case is Securities & Exchange Commission v. Panuwat, No. 3:21-cv-06322 (N.D. Cal. Aug 17, 2021).
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[1] Secs. & Exchg. Comm’n v. Panuwat, No. 3:21-cv-06322 (N.D. Cal. Aug 17, 2021), Dkt. No. 210.
[2] Dkt. No. 189 at 20-21.
[3] See Shadow Trading, M. Mehta, D. Reeb & W. Zhao, Accounting Rev. (2021) 96 (4): 367-404.
[4] Dkt. 210 at 28-29.
[5] Id. at 29.
[6] G. Grewal, Statement on Jury’s Verdict in Trial of Matthew Panuwat, Secs. & Exchg. Comm’n (Apr. 5, 2024) available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/grewal-statement-040524.
[7] Dkt. 210 at 10.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 6, citing S.E.C. v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-63 (1997).
[10] Id. at 11.
[11] Id. at 12.
[12] Id. at 40.
[13] Id. at 40-41.
On May 29, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a motion for final judgment, seeking to impose civil penalties in its first enforcement action brought on the theory of “shadow trading.”[1]
The SEC secured a jury verdict finding Matthew Panuwat liable for violating insider trading laws on April 5, 2024 after an eight-day trial. Shadow Trading is a type of illegal insider trading in which material non-public information (“MNPI”) regarding one company is leveraged to execute a securities transaction regarding a second company whose share price is predictably correlated to the disclosure of the MNPI.[2]
The agency’s requested penalty would: (1) prohibit Panuwat from serving as an officer or director of publicly traded companies;[3] and (2) require Panuwat to pay a civil penalty of $321,197.40.[4]
The monetary amount the SEC is seeking is “equal to three times Panuwat’s trading profits, as measured based on the August 22, 2016 prices of his Incyte call options”[5] based on the agency’s application of a six-factor test regarding insider trading:
(1) the egregiousness of the violations;
(2) the isolated or repeated nature of the violations;
(3) the defendant’s financial worth;
(4) whether the defendant concealed his trading;
(5) what other penalties arise as the result of the defendant’s conduct; and
(6) whether the defendant is employed in the securities industry.[6]
The SEC contends that a number of factors weigh in favor of a “substantial penalty,” even in light of this being Panuwat’s first violation.[7] The agency pointed to Panuwat’s admitted net worth, his prior employment in the securities industry, his efforts to conceal his trading, and the absence of any other penalty.[8] Further, the SEC characterized Panuwat’s conduct as “egregious,” noting that he was a sophisticated trader and former investment banker who admitted to knowing that trading securities based on his company’s MNPI was prohibited.[9]
As we noted in SEC Wins Shadow Trading Trial But Court Will Get a Second Look, the Court is also called upon to rule on Panuwat’s renewed motion for judgement as a matter of law seeking to overturn the jury’s verdict.[10]
Panuwat claims that the evidence presented at trial fails as a matter of law to demonstrate scienter because the jury could not draw the inference of Panuwat’s intent without resorting to an unacceptable “series of speculative inferences.”[11] The defendant argues that the SEC’s evidence relied primarily on the timing of Panuwat’s trading, which invited the jury to draw a conclusion based on a post hoc, ergo propter hoc logical fallacy.[12]
Panuwat has also filed a motion seeking a new trial.[13] Panuwat’s request rests in part on the Court’s rulings that precluded the defendant from informing the jury that this was the SEC’s first shadow trading enforcement action. Panuwat asserts that the Court compounded this error by allowing the SEC to characterize the shadow trading theory as “garden variety insider trading,” branding the decision as “grossly unfair.”[14]
The defendant’s motion further claims that the Court’s jury instruction was improperly prejudicial because it “endorse[d] the SEC’s insider trading label,” pointing to a distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading. Panuwat’s motion asserts that the Supreme Court explained that misappropriation-based liability is done by outsiders, the two terms are not interchangeable, and the Court’s use of the term “insider” was erroneous when it could have used the “misappropriation.”[15]
In deciding these motions, we expect the Court to articulate the first standard for determining whether and the extent to which unrelated securities issuers are "linked" for purposes of shadow trading liability, and a more definitive statement from the Ninth Circuit in the event of an appeal.
The case is Securities & Exchange Commission v. Panuwat, Dkt No. 3:21-cv-06322 (N.D. Cal. Aug 17, 2021).
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[1] Secs. & Exchg. Comm’n v. Panuwat, Dkt No. 3:21-cv-06322 (N.D. Cal. Aug 17, 2021), Dkt. No. 189.
[2] See Shadow Trading, M. Mehta, D. Reeb & W. Zhao, Accounting Rev. (2021) 96 (4): 367-404.
[3] Specifically, the SEC seeks to bar Panuwat from serving as an officer or director for any securities issuer: (1) that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78l]; or (2) that is required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)]. Dkt. No. 189-1 at 2.
[4] Dkt. No. 189-1.
[5] Dkt. No. 189 at 20-21.
[6] SEC v. Gowrish, No. C 09-5883 SI, 2011 WL 2790482, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2011)) (citing factors articulated in S.E.C. v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 32 (1st Cir. 2004)).
[7] Dkt. No. 189 at 22.
[8] Id. at 21-22.
[9] Id. at 20-21.
[10] Dkt. No. 191.
[11] Id. at 4, 26 (citing Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah Cnty., 556 F.3d 797 at 802 (9th Cir. 2009)).
[12] Id. at 26. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc (Latin: “after this, therefore because of this”) is an error in reasoning in which causation is incorrectly inferred when one event precedes another.
[13] Dkt. No. 192.
[14] Id. at 28.
[15] Id. at 16-17, (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), at 652).
On April 5, 2024, after an eight-day trial, a jury found Matthew Panuwat liable for violating insider trading laws. [1] Commenting on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s victory, Gurbir Grewal, the agency’s Director of the Division of Enforcement stated:
“As we’ve said all along, there was nothing novel about this matter, and the jury agreed: this was insider trading, pure and simple. Defendant used highly confidential information about an impending announcement of the acquisition of biopharmaceutical company Medivation, Inc., the company where he worked, by Pfizer Inc. to trade ahead of the news for his own enrichment. Rather than buying the securities of Medivation, however, Panuwat used his employer’s confidential information to acquire a large stake in call options of another comparable public company, Incyte Corporation, whose share price increased materially on the important news.” [2]
As we noted in Shadow Trading Case Heads to Trial, the widely-followed case was the SEC’s first enforcement action brought on the theory of “shadow trading,” a type of illegal insider trading in which material non-public information (“MNPI”) from one company is leveraged to execute a transaction in the securities of a second company whose share price is predictably correlated to the disclosure of the MNPI. [3]
Critics of the SEC’s position have raised concerns over the scope of shadow trading liability, with the Investor Choice Advocates Network claiming that the SEC’s shadow trading theory risks “creating numerous industry-wide and/or sector-wide trading blackout periods.” [4]
While the Court rejected these arguments in pre-trial briefing, [5] Judge William H. Orrick will have another opportunity to consider the legal boundaries of shadow trading.
Panuwat Moves to Overturn Verdict
Promptly after the jury returned its verdict, Panuwat filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, focusing in part on the aspect that has the potential to affect the widest range of market participants, the connection between: (1) news of the acquisition of Panuwat’s employer, Medivation; and (2) the share price of Incyte, another publicly traded pharmaceutical company. [6]
Panuwat’s motion asserts that the SEC’s evidence linking his trading to the MNPI [7] amounted to two showings, the timing of the trade (seven minutes after an email confirming the acquisition) and a series of analyst presentations that identified Incyte as a Medivation industry peer. [8] Panuwat claims that this fails as a matter of law to demonstrate scienter because the jury could not draw the inference of Panuwat’s intent without resorting to an unacceptable “series of speculative inferences.” [9]
This motion will offer the Court an occasion to articulate a standard for determining whether and the extent to which unrelated securities issuers are “linked” for purposes of shadow trading liability. We expect that this case of first impression will lead to a more definitive statement from the Ninth Circuit in the months to come.
The case is Securities and Exchange Commission v. Panuwat, Docket No. 3:21-cv-06322 (N.D. Cal. Aug 17, 2021).
[1] Secs. & Exchg. Comm’n v. Panuwat, Dkt No. 3:21-cv-06322 (N.D. Cal. Aug 17, 2021).
[2] G. Grewal, Statement on Jury’s Verdict in Trial of Matthew Panuwat, Secs. & Exchg. Comm’n (Apr. 5, 2024) available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/grewal-statement-040524.
[3] See Shadow Trading, M. Mehta, D. Reeb & W. Zhao, Accounting Rev. (2021) 96 (4): 367-404.
[4] Dkt. No. 81 at 7-8.
[5] Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Panuwat, No. 21-CV-06322-WHO, 2023 WL 9375861, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2023).
[6] Dkt. No. 158.
[7] Panuwat’s motion also contests the jury’s conclusion that the news of the acquisition was non-public. Id.
[8] Dkt. No. 158 at 11-12.
[9] Id. (quoting Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah Cnty.,556 F.3d 797 at 802 (9th Cir. 2009)).


Practice Area Attorney
David Erroll is a Practice Area Attorney in the firm's Litigation department. Prior to joining the firm, Mr. Erroll spent over 15 years in private practice, including at a New Jersey-based national law firm, and two New York-based law firms. Prior to attending law school, Mr. Erroll served in the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps. as a Cryptologic Linguist.