Circuit Denies “Pharma Bro” Martin Shkreli’s Appeal of His Conviction and District Court’s Forfeiture Order
On July 18, 2019, the Second Circuit issued a summary order in United States v. Shkreli (Jacobs, Livingston, Bianco) affirming the conviction and sentence of Martin Shkreli after his highly publicized 2017 trial in which he was convicted on two counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud. Shkreli was often known as the “Pharma Bro” because of his public statements about his drug company’s price increases in the pharmaceutical industry. On appeal, Shkreli challenged the district court’s “no ultimate harm” (“NUH”) jury instruction and its order requiring him to forfeit approximately $6.5 million that had been invested in his hedge funds.
Court Allows Wife of Criminal Defendant to Amend Challenge to Forfeiture of Allegedly Commingled Assets on Due Process Grounds
In United States v. Daugerdas, the Court (Walker, Lynch, Chin) offered a lifeline to the wife of a defendant convicted of tax fraud, who sought to assert a third-party interest in funds that the Second Circuit had previously determined were forfeitable to the government as proceeds of the defendant’s crimes. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that petitioner Eleanor Daugerdas failed to state a claim that she was entitled to retain funds that her husband, defendant Paul Daugerdas, had gratuitously transferred to her. She sought to argue that the tainted funds had been commingled with legitimately earned funds prior to their transfer and therefore could not easily be traced back to Paul’s crimes. But the question of whether the seized funds arose from Paul’s criminal activity had been decided in the affirmative by the district court as part of Paul’s sentencing. As a result, the district court held that Eleanor could not relitigate the issue of whether those funds should be characterized not as criminal proceeds but as substitute assets, which would require the government to seek forfeiture of other property belonging to Paul.
In a case arising out of the CityTime scandal, the Second Circuit issued a thoughtful opinion addressing the operation of restitution and asset forfeiture on victims of white-collar crime. The decision, Federal Insurance Company v. United States of America, Nos. 16-2967-op and 16-3402-cr, emphasizes that though restitution and forfeiture are both means for victims to be made whole, they are not subject to the same analysis. Ultimately, the Court (Parker, Lynch, Carney) affirmed the decision denying restitution, but remanded for additional proceedings on forfeiture. The decision is worth a careful read for those representing victims in white-collar criminal matters, and also serves as a road map for how district court judges might approach these issues in the future.
In a short opinion in United States v. Ohle, 16-601-cr, the Second Circuit (Leval, Calabresi, Cabranes) resolved two open questions about the application of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, both in the context of a proceeding brought under Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(n). Section 853(n) is the provision of forfeiture law that can be invoked by a third party who claims to have a superior interest in assets that the government is seeking to forfeit. The Circuit held that although 853(n) proceedings arise in the aftermath of a criminal conviction, these ancillary proceedings are civil in nature. The Circuit also held that when the district court issues a short order resolving a motion and promises that a more detailed opinion will follow, plaintiffs may not wait for the more detailed opinion; the time to appeal begins to run upon the issuance of the initial order.
Second Circuit Finds Death Extinguishes Trial Convictions and Related Restitution Order – But Tax Offenses and Bail Forfeiture Survive
In 2010, a federal jury in the Eastern District of New York convicted body-armor tycoon David H. Brooks of multiple counts of conspiracy, insider trading, fraud, and obstruction of justice for his role in a $200 million scheme to enrich himself from company coffers. Brooks was the founder and former chief executive of DHB Industries, the leading supplier of bulletproof vests to police departments and the U.S. military. Brooks later pleaded guilty to associated charges of conspiracy to defraud the IRS and filing false income tax returns that had been severed from the rest of the case. While he appealed the result of his jury trial, he did not appeal the tax fraud convictions (pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement). Brooks died in prison while his appeal was pending, forcing the Second Circuit to revisit an obscure area of law to decide what aspects of his convictions, if anything, survived his death. Ultimately, Brooks’s death in prison led to the abatement of his trial convictions, and with that abatement, the erasure of significant restitution obligations that Brooks otherwise would have owed.
On July 7, 2017, the Second Circuit (Jacobs, Leval, Raggi) issued a short summary order in United States v. Stegemann. Most of the order is dedicated to affirming the defendant’s conviction at trial on several drug and firearm-related offenses, but at the end the Court reverses the order of forfeiture imposed as part of the defendant’s sentence, in part with the government’s consent.
In United States v. Bodouva, 16-3937 (March 22, 2017) (Katzmann, C.J., Pooler and Lynch, J.), the Court held in a per curiam order that a defendant convicted of embezzlement must forfeit the full amount of her illicit gains to the government even after paying restitution to victims. The ostensibly “duplicative” financial penalty entered against the defendant was not only permissible, but in fact required by statute. The district court thus appropriately ruled at sentencing that it lacked discretion to modify the forfeiture amount. With this decision, the Second Circuit joined several other circuits in holding that restitution and forfeiture serve distinct purposes and, absent clear statutory authority to the contrary, may not offset each other.
On August 17, 2016, the Second Circuit issued a decision in United States v. Stevenson, No. 14-1862-cr, holding that a state legislator convicted of bribery could be required to forfeit a portion of his pension fund as part of a sentence. Former New York State Assemblyman Eric Stevenson was convicted in 2014 of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery and to violate the Travel Act, accepting bribes, and extortion under color of official right. The charges arose out of an investigation finding that Stevenson took bribes of $22,000 from businessmen in the Bronx who ran an adult day care center in exchange for proposing legislation that would have imposed a moratorium on new facilities that would have provided competition.
In In re 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties, 14-2027 (Kearse, Raggi, Wesley), the Second Circuit vacated an award forfeiting the appellants’—the Alavi Foundation and 650 Fifth Avenue Company—properties to the United States. The lower court ordered the forfeiture of the properties, including inter alia, a 36-story office building located at 650 Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, on two grounds: (1) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) as proceeds traceable to violations of the International Emergency Powers Act and certain Iranian Transactions Regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury, and (2) as property involved in money laundering transactions forfeitable under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).